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Since its independence on July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan, with the assistance of 
various internal and external stakeholders, has been working towards viable and 
constructive political and socio-economic change in the new state. These processes of 
change are aimed at the effective development of South Sudan as a sovereign, peaceful and 
stable nation-state that is capable of serving the short- and long-term needs and 
expectations of its citizens and the environment at large. However, the successful 
realisation of this transformation is facing serious challenges. These challenges are partly 
attributable to the unresolved issues and consequences of South Sudan’s protracted years 
of civil war with Sudan, and the difficulties that often confront post-conflict societies, 
especially a post-independence state like South Sudan, which came into existence after two 
prolonged civil wars. Given the complexity of South Sudan’s post-independence 
environment, this study aims to gain a clearer understanding of South Sudan’s complex 
transformational and peace-building challenges as an independent state; and to propose 
recommendations on how they can be managed. This will be achieved through the use of 
historical and qualitative research methods, which locate the study within a framework 
that provides the basis for the analyses of the data collected on South Sudan and on the 
subjects of conflict transformation and peace-building. 
 
As South Sudan celebrated its one-year anniversary on July 9, 2012, it was recalled that the 
country’s official independence was regarded as a historic event for the African continent 
at large. While there were high expectations among the South Sudanese population and the 
international community that this signalled an end to Africa’s longest conflict, it was soon 
clouded by a myriad of political, economic, socio-cultural, peace, security and development 
challenges. These include building an entirely new state out of the ruins of war, confronting 
the unresolved resource and border demarcation conflicts with Sudan, and tackling South 
Sudan’s own internal ethnic confrontations, among many other human resources and 
capacity challenges. Given South Sudan’s challenging post-conflict and post-independence 
environment, this study contends that contrary to the notion that the resolution and 
transformation of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the birth of the new Republic of 
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South Sudan ended the conflict between the two entities, the secession did not create a 
cohesive and robust new state that is free from serious internal and external challenges.  
 
The Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and external and internal stakeholders, including 
the African Union (AU); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the 
United Nations (UN); civil society organisations (CSOs) and various individual countries 
(among many other initiatives) have been and are actively engaged in joint efforts to 
address and manage the challenges that confront South Sudan as an independent state. 
However, such endeavours have mainly concentrated on state-building issues, resources 
and border demarcation conflicts, and have focused less on the problems of nation-
building. As such, internal complexities such as social and national identity, the 
decentralisation of power/broader representation in government and state affairs and 
growing ethnic conflicts have continued to receive less attention.  Bearing this in mind, this 
study argues that unless these internal matters are given serious consideration, sustainable 
peace and development in South Sudan will remain elusive. While negotiations to resolve 
the cross-border South Sudan-Sudan conflicts continue, a solution that is acceptable to all 
parties is only possible if all the conflicting parties are invited to the negotiation table to 
engage in peaceful dialogue and find the means to reconcile their differences and build 
trustworthy and mutually beneficial relationships. The study also identifies a need for the 
promotion and coordination of a constructive relationship between the South Sudanese 
state and civil society. It further recognises the importance of building inclusive political 
processes to facilitate a state-society cooperative environment, and the development of 
state capacity to perform its duties in a manner that satisfies the expectations of the 
population that they will enjoy the fruits of their long-drawn out struggle for independence.   
 
In terms of how these processes can be achieved, the study recommends an indigenous 
intervention mechanism that encourages the active engagement of the entire post-conflict 
society in its own peace-building and development initiatives.  This mechanism is 
encapsulated in John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model of conflict transformation, which 
emphasises the importance of coordinating peace-building activities between and among 
the various leadership levels – the top, middle and grassroots leaders of the post-conflict 
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society.  This model also advocates that the local community be encouraged to develop and 
drive its own peace-building and development activities, which is a major step forward in 
reconciling differences, building a sense of belonging, trust, mutual respect and ultimately 
societal cohesion. These are very important considerations for any society or state with the 
long-term goal of sustainable peace and development. The research study thus 
recommends this model for managing South Sudan’s challenges. It urges all stakeholders to 
promote the involvement of the local community in peace-building and development 
activities and to facilitate peaceful dialogue and reconciliation within South Sudan and with 
Sudan in order to achieve viable peace and development in the longer term. 
 
Key Words: South Sudan; conflict; post-conflict and post-independence challenges; 




1. Introduction: Orientation of the Research Theme 
 
1.1. An Overview and Background of the Study 
 
South Sudan is a post-conflict society and a sovereign state. Its historic transition from a 
region of the Republic of Sudan (RoS) into an independent state came after decades of 
being ravaged by two prolonged and devastating civil wars with the Northern part of 
Sudan. These wars were a threat to peace and security in both the Northern and Southern 
Sudan territories and the republic as a whole, causing widespread environmental and 
infrastructural destruction, regional instabilities, increasing numbers of displaced persons 
and refugees, and an enormous loss of human lives. Having transformed from a conflict-
engulfed Southern region into a self-governing country – the Republic of South Sudan 
(RoSS) – its post-conflict and post-independence transformation is threatened by the 
possibility of renewed violent conflict with Sudan and internal violent strife. These 
endpoints at which the newly independent RoSS finds itself can be attributable to a number 
of grave challenges, which include not only dealing with the consequences and unresolved 
problems of its long-drawn out conflict with Sudan, but also the difficulty of building from 
scratch a brand new state and a nation that is politically and socio-economically self-
sufficient to meet the needs and demands of its population. 
 
As South Sudan struggles to address its difficulties in order to build a sustainable peaceful 
and stable society, it is imperative to note that there are still a number of issues militating 
against its peace efforts and processes. The literature on peace and conflict analysis notes 
that in many post-conflict situations, conflict transformation and peace-building (CTPB) are 
subject to a multitude of challenges, which expose the post-conflict society to the 
vulnerabilities of war and peace-building complexities for some time.  The propensity of 
such challenges to impede constructive change, development, and peace processes in war-
prone and post-conflict societies has prompted international, regional and local 
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communities and organisations to launch initiatives to manage and overcome such 
obstacles. Many such initiatives aim to address fragility and consolidate stability in a 
particular conflict country or region. However, the literature stresses that challenges to 
peace and development are not restricted to the conflict-affected community alone, but 
also may indirectly affect the intervening bodies and actors (Ball, 2002: 38).  
 
Developing and engaging mechanisms to manage conflict challenges, especially in the 
aftermath of conflict, entail multifarious political, economic and socio-cultural processes 
aimed at continuous efforts to: address the conflict relations in a non-violent manner; 
moderate violence and mitigate the chances of relapse into conflict or its escalation; build 
harmonious, tolerant relationships; and build and support existing capacity for the 
enhancement of sustainable peace and development in the longer-term (Schirch, 2008: 9). 
These processes are necessary to promote peace and stability and involve multi-
dimensional and multi-sectoral undertakings of infrastructural (re)construction, 
(re)building institutions and endeavours to reconcile differences that will establish 
collaboration between communities and groups (Lederach, 2003). At the heart of conflict 
transformation and peace-building, therefore, is the need not only to understand the root 
causes of the conflict and engage in constructive change processes, but also (and most 
importantly), to build healthy relationships between the warring factions, as well as 
between the state and the society. This, in turn, can help define and foster coordinated 
efforts capable of enabling change in the structures of violence and achieving sustainable 
peace and development in the longer term (Lederach, 2003; Schirch, 2008: 8).  
 
Since the development of conflict transformation and peace-building strategies in the early 
1990s, conflicted societies worldwide, and especially those on the African continent, have 
experimented with the implementation of these (reconstruction, institutional and capacity 
development and reconciliation) processes. In Africa, such initiatives have been successful 
in post-conflict societies like South Africa, Lesotho, Mozambique and Sierra Leone, while in 
other countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and the Sudans, 




Reychler (2001: 12) asserts that the implementation of conflict transformation and peace-
building mechanisms is challenged in some cases because, in the process of transformation, 
some conflicts are transformed in a constructive and reciprocally satisfactory manner, 
while others end up frustrating one or all of the parties involved in the conflict. Debiel 
(2002: 8) maintains that it is a normal for societies which have experienced war and are in 
a recovery phase to be challenged by the history of the conflict and its consequences, as 
well as other peace-building difficulties. The massive influence of insurgents, the difficult 
reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) back into 
mainstream society, and the challenge of what constitutes social identity are common 
problems faced by countries emerging from violent conflicts (Debiel, 2002: 8). Similarly, 
there are challenges in “strengthening political institutions, promoting economic and social 
revitalisation, providing a safe and secure environment for poverty-reducing development 
and promoting a reasonable, equitable and fruitful political development and security of 
individuals, social groups and the society at large” (Ball, 2002: 35 & 36). 
 
While these post-conflict challenges may seem generic, they are not homogeneous and vary 
from one post-conflict society to another. However, their (un)intended influence on peace-
building and development projects undermines the prospects for durable peace, as has 
been the case with post-conflict and post-independence South Sudan.  
 
After almost four decades of conflict with the Sudanese government, the Southern Sudan 
region has not only entered a post-conflict phase, but also has emerged as an independent 
state. Since the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which officially 
ended the Sudan-South Sudan conflict followed by the proclamation of independence on 
July 9, 2011, South Sudan has been going through a process of transformation – attempting 
to build a new state and a nation out of the ruins and remnants of war, and the internal and 
external relationships that were destroyed as a result of years of violent conflicts. Peace-
building efforts have included agreements, policy provisions, humanitarian and 
developmental assistance, and institutional and security arrangements largely overseen by 
international and regional actors/organisations, the South Sudanese government and a 
small number of civil society organisations (CSOs) (Government of the Republic of South 
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Sudan, 2011(a)). While these processes have prevented the outbreak of renewed or fresh 
violent conflicts between the Sudan and South Sudan, and within the South Sudanese 
communities, peace remains very fragile. This is because resilient challenges such as 
resources and border land demarcations disputes, political and socio-economic governance 
disparities, and most notably, South-South violent clashes between ethnic groups have 
continued to pose a serious threat to development and the attainment of a stable peace. 
 
Given this complex scenario in South Sudan, the following questions arise: Why do the 
processes of conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan continue to be 
challenged? Why does peace still remain an unattainable dream in South Sudan and what 
can be done to enhance these processes? These questions are at the centre of this research. 
In order to gain some perspective on these issues, this study sets out to assess South 
Sudan’s post-independence environment and investigates the factors constraining its 
smooth and successful transition to a peaceful sovereign state. In this light, the study 
examines the implementation of conflict transformation and peace-building processes and 
the challenges these processes face. Likewise, it evaluates the peace-building efforts of 
international stakeholders as well as the role of the government and CSOs in enhancing 
peace and development in South Sudan. This is vital in order to determine the reasons why 
the attainment of peace has remained elusive and why development has remained slow, 
despite various initiatives and the progress made in building a peaceful and secure South 
Sudanese state.  
 
Adopting a forward-looking perspective on South Sudan’s challenges, the study proffers 
recommendations by drawing on lessons that offer an understanding that building trust 
and healthy relationships is central to conflict transformation and sustainable peace-
building. Thus, the study suggests that as peace and development remain an ongoing 
process in South Sudan, the mechanisms employed must be coordinated and aimed at 
creating a solid vision for long-term peace and security. This would be made possible by 
creating communal trust and engaging in projects that are mutually beneficial to the 




1.2. Delineating the Research Problem and Argument 
This research examines the complexity of South Sudan’s problems, which are not limited to 
the fundamentals and agendas of (re)building a post-conflict society, but also involve 
building a completely new state ‘out of nothing’. As a new and developing state, South 
Sudan has to contend with a plethora of rising tensions and transformation challenges, 
which in this context also imply challenges to state-building1 and nation-building2. Given 
that it has just emerged from conflict with Sudan, South Sudan presents an intricate and 
fragile situation, which will manifest itself in at least one of two possible directions: (1) 
growing into one of Africa’s stable and accountable governments; or (2) relapsing into civil 
tension orchestrated by an internally divided and impatient population demanding 
expedient and sustainable improvements in life within independent South Sudan.  
 
The RoSS is located in eastern Africa and borders six countries: Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, 
Kenya, the DRC and Central African Republic (CAR). The country comprises a culturally 
diverse population, which according to the 2008 population census is made up of 
approximately 8.2 million people (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(b)).  
South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources, including petroleum, iron ore, 
gold, silver, copper, aluminium, coal, uranium, chromium ore, zinc, mica, diamonds, quartz, 
tungsten, teak, water and land (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(b)).  
 
South Sudan’s geographic borders, heterogeneity, and natural resources speak to the 
country’s wealth. However, they also provide the context and platform for South Sudan’s 
                                                          
1 “State-building is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven 
by state society relations. Positive state-building processes involve reciprocal relations between a state that 
delivers services for its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their state. 
State-building therefore involves multiple national stakeholders that continually negotiate and transform the 
political process” (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 10). 
2 Nation-building is the process of building a sense of a common national identity, whether defined in an 
ethnic, cultural or political sense. It can be an important part of the process of state-building and both can 




past and present conflict dynamics not only with the Republic of Sudan (RoS) but also 
within itself. The facts that South Sudan shares boundaries with several war-torn and war-
prone countries tends to impact negatively not only on its peace and stability but also on its 
development agenda.  
 
South Sudan’s conflict with Sudan spanned the periods 1955-1972 and 1983-2005. The 
proliferation of these conflicts in one of Africa’s most conflicted-regions (Martell, 2011) 
presented major challenges to international and regional efforts aimed at resolving conflict 
and achieving transformation. Symptomatic of the challenges were the stalemates 
experienced in the implementation of the first attempt at conflict resolution – the 1972 
Addis Ababa Agreement – as well as subsequent attempts. All efforts aimed at addressing 
the conflict and achieving reconciliation proved elusive until the 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement. The fact that 99 percent of South Sudanese voted for independence sent 
a message of a united people with a common purpose and signalled an end to the decades-
long conflict. South Sudan achieved sovereignty but this was accompanied by challenges 
which emerged immediately following independence. These challenges were not limited to 
politically, economically and socially weak institutions. They also included extremely poor 
infrastructure; unresolved disputed resource and border territories; a population 
extremely lacking in formal education, technical capacity and skilled human resources; and, 
most disturbingly, an ethnically divided populace (Mbaku and Smith, 2012: 1). 
 
The  literature on peace-building has focused on issues such as the continuing effects of the 
consequences of war, governments' inadequate or complete lack of legitimacy, the over-
centralisation of state systems, and the inability of state authorities to guarantee national 
peace, development and security. Futamura, Newman and Tadjbakhsh (2010: 2), for 
example, argue that the first challenge to building long-term peace in post-conflict societies 
lies in the reasons for international intervention in the first place. This is due to the threats 
that conflict societies pose to international security and stability. Because they have 
international security at heart, such interventions tend to be driven by the belief that the 
major problem with conflict prone and post-conflict states is the absence of effective state 
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institutions. As a result, they concentrate their efforts on promoting strong states and 
containing conflict for the sake of international security (Futamura et al., 2012: 2 & 3).  
 
The importance of supporting post-conflict societies to build accountable governments and 
lay the foundation for effective state institutions cannot be overemphasised. The problem, 
however, is that such a state-focused approach often overlooks the importance of the 
ethnic dimension to peace-building.  As a logical consequence, the needs and grievances of 
the ethnic local populations directly affected by the past conflict and who may suffer if new 
conflicts begin are often ignored. Worst still, their views, suggestions and initiatives aimed 
at finding solutions to the real problems are either marginally considered or disregarded 
altogether, leading to their alienation. 
 
In South Sudan, international stakeholders like the African Union (AU), the United Nations 
(UN) and the European Union (EU) are investing significant financial resources through 
multiple humanitarian assistance programmes and rehabilitation and (re)construction 
projects, as well as economic stabilisation, human rights monitoring, education and 
empowerment for political participation initiatives. There have also been numerous 
negotiations to resolve the problems in contested resource-rich areas. Notwithstanding 
these efforts, there are increasing media reports of non-stop militarisation around the oil-
rich areas of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Unity States and battles for control of the 
oil-producing Heglig (Soliman, 2012). 
 
In Pflanz’s (2012) view, these challenges may eventually ignite a fresh and sustained 
conflict. The focus on building state institutions and resolving resource conflicts seems to 
have taken precedence not only over the government’s agendas but those of intervening 
and donor organisations/bodies. As a result, those challenges have weighed down the 
ability of those actors to give equal attention to crucial factors like addressing the ethnic 
divides within the South Sudanese or enlisting the conflict resolution and mediation tools 




The fact that South Sudan continues to experience power imbalances, and that a number of 
factors are hindering its peace and development endeavours does not imply that the 
presence of external support is not critical and appropriate in creating and ensuring peace. 
However, Ball (2002: 35) argues that such support should complement, rather than 
substitute for local efforts for sustainable peace. In similar vein, Mercy Corps (a global aid 
agency) argues that external investments to achieve peace in post-conflict societies have 
limited potential to bring about peace in the absence of concurrent efforts aimed at 
promoting inter-ethnic understanding and cooperation (International Alert, 2006: 401). 
The organisation further argues that attaining sustainable peace is possible if development 
programmes are implemented to restore relationships between conflicting communities by 
bringing them together to discuss issues of common concern (International Alert, 2006: 
401). Similarly, De Maio (2009: 47) contends that although external efforts have been 
proven to be necessary in conflict-ridden societies, they are not sufficient to safeguard 
peaceful relationships or resolve the strategic problems challenging development; local 
peace-builders are indispensable to this process.   
 
Given the above, this study presents two major arguments:  
 
First: That contrary to the notion that the resolution of Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the 
birth of the new Republic of South Sudan ended the conflict between Sudan and South 
Sudan, the secession has not created a cohesive and robust new state that is free of serious 
internal and external challenges. Anchored on this premise, the study contends that 
confrontations arising out of internal power disparities are the result of power struggles 
emanating from complex political, economic and social imbalances within South Sudan. 
These issues engender violent conflicts and obfuscate efforts to create a cooperative, 
cohesive, and secure environment for sustainable peace and development. 
 
Second: That beyond building a new state and effective state institutions in South Sudan, 
the breakdown of long-established political, economic and socio-cultural relations that 
were the root of the protracted years of two civil wars still needs to be constructively and 
reciprocally addressed. Therefore, irrespective of the resources invested in addressing 
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current challenges and opportunities in South Sudan and Sudan, sustainable peace will 
remain elusive unless the relationship issues between the two states and within the South 
Sudan ethnic communities are reconciled through a national (or broad-based)  consultative 
and cooperative peace-building process. The development of healthy relationships 
within/between ethnic groups and communities is crucial for cooperative and long-term 
interactive engagement, which is necessary for the advancement of lasting peace and 
development. 
 
Proponents of the conflict transformation theory, including John Paul Lederach, Johan 
Galtung, and Kumar Rupesinghe as variously cited by Miall (2004) emphasise the 
importance of the constructive transformation of broken relationships within and beyond 
the conflict and post-conflict society as a central component of the process of peace-
building. Amidst the many obstacles to peace in South Sudan, this research draws 
particular attention to the challenge of ethnic divisions.  Lederach, for example, argues that 
poor relationships between groups are all too often a trigger for conflict, and remain a 
critical hindrance to peace-building efforts after the violence has abated (Miall, 2004: 8). 
Lederach further proposes a model for building relationships and trust in divided societies. 
The Pyramid Model promotes the coordination of efforts and activities at all levels of 
society. This approach stresses multinational facilitation and encouragement directed at 
the three most important leadership clusters of a society – the top, the middle, and the 
grassroots. The model thus aims to bring about social and political change through building 
trust, mutual relationships and structural conditions that are not only supportive of peace 
and social justice, but are also crucial in creating settings that enable constructive and 
decisive integration in the society and foster the active participation of civil society and 
local community groups in activities aimed at building a viable peace (Lederach, 2003). 
This, Lederach states, is achievable when peace is built from below by empowering the 
communities that have been destroyed by war, taking into consideration and linking into 
the peace-building process the cultures and traditions of the conflict communities, and 




1.3. Research Questions 
On the basis of the foregoing problems and arguments, this study is defined by three main 
research questions: 
 
Q1. What are the major challenges impinging on South Sudan’s transformational change 
and peace-building capacity? 
 
Q2. How can the challenges be managed and would the promotion of peaceful dialogue 
between the Southern ethnic groups as well as with Sudan enhance and empower 
South Sudan's quest for long-term peace and development?  
 
Q3. What/how can external and internal stakeholders heighten their support for local 
efforts and facilitate the processes of reconciliation within South Sudan and 
between the two Sudans as a step towards confidence building, mutual 
relationships, sustainable peace, development, and societal/national cohesion? 
 
1.4. Research Hypotheses 
Given these aforementioned problems and questions, two central assumptions are made:  
 
H1. That achieving the required state of change (successful transformation from 
resistance to independence) and peace in South Sudan will continue to be elusive if 
attempts at managing its challenges remain focused on the problems of weak state 
institutions and resource-rich/border land confrontations (among others), to the 
exclusion of the problem of fragmented ethnic groups, which continues to create a 
lack of trust and cooperation in the society.  
 
H2. That South Sudan’s post-independence challenges can only be addressed if 
stakeholders dedicate considerable efforts to dealing with ethnic divisions and 
engage ethnic communities in: (1) peaceful dialogue aimed at addressing their 
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ethnic differences; and (2) reconciliation projects aimed at national/societal healing 
and confidence building between the various communities as key to managing not 
only the fragile peace but also advancing development in South Sudan. 
 
The first hypothesis creates a point of departure that provides the necessary information to 
investigate the relationship between ethnic divisions and their impact on peace-building in 
post-independence South Sudan. The second hypothesis validates the importance of 
building healthy, interactive and reciprocated relationships as a necessary dimension of 
peace-building processes and as a pathway to overcoming the challenges in post-conflict 
and post-independence South Sudan. By extension, this implies the need to use the same 
approach in dealing with the relationship concerns between South Sudan and Sudan. 
Notter (1995: 3 & 8) states that building trust and transforming conflicts centres on 
relationship issues, especially considering that there is a strong connection between trust 
and cooperation. This leads to the conclusion that transforming conflict relations and 
building trust is central to the analysis of any conflict and fundamental to the peace-
building process, especially between the conflicting parties. 
 
1.5. Research Objectives 
The three main objectives of this study are to: 
 
1. Identify and examine the major challenges hindering South Sudan’s development 
and peace-building efforts. 
 
2. Assess the magnitude of the challenges confronting South Sudan, especially the 
ongoing latent and potential inter-ethnic conflicts on peace-building and 
development efforts. 
 
3. Offer recommendations as to how South Sudan’s challenges can be managed and the 
role of external and local actors in addressing the impact of ethnic divisions on 
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peace efforts through peaceful dialogue, project involvement and building trust, for 
the enhancement of social cohesion as well as coordinated efforts for sustainable 
peace and development. 
 
1.6. Justification for the Study 
The history of the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan is a rich area of study. Until 
2005, attempts to address these conflicts were hampered by insurmountable structural, 
socio-economic and political impediments. While the conflict has supposedly ended, post-
conflict development and peace-building efforts face a multitude of challenges that 
undermine state-building and nation-building. Given this situation, this study is motivated 
by the need to investigate what conflict transformation and peace-building strategies are 
being employed in South Sudan; what factors are constraining their effective 
implementation; and most importantly, how the situation can be addressed and managed.   
 
The researcher hopes that this study will constitute a significant addition to the existing or 
related literature on conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan. The study 
recommends the adoption of a transformation strategy that calls for the active 
involvement, participation and contribution of the different communities and local groups 
in decision-making processes and peace-building activities. The researcher believes that 
this strategy is the pathway to building social relations and trust among the divided South 
Sudanese people and communities. The researcher also anticipates that the research 
outcomes will provide policy makers with a perspective to deliberate on and formulate 
solutions that are specific to South Sudan’s problems and/or amend the policies and steps 
already undertaken to address the challenges. Policy makers need to take into account the 
ethnic context of conflicts and design interventions that explicitly address ethnic problems 
and relationships destroyed as a result of war. Addressing ethnic differences is seldom a 
priority in conflict and post-conflict societies; rather, the emphasis is on (re)building state 
institutions and addressing resource conflicts. Finally, it is hoped that this study will 
generate scholarly interest in the interconnection between political science, international 
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relations and conflict transformation and peace studies, as well as contribute to making a 
difference in real conflicts and similar post-conflict situations.  
 
1.7. Theoretical Framework 
 “It is a precept of academic engagement with conflict/peace studies that a 
good understanding of the causes of a conflict is a prerequisite for its 
resolution” (Klein, 2002:161). 
 
According to Gibson (1986: 143), theory and research are closely intertwined parts of 
a coherent body of knowledge and a paradigm that can assist in selecting and 
construing facts. This research study is designed and contextualised within the 
framework of conflict transformation theory. This theory underscores the importance 
of “addressing the structural roots of conflict by changing existing patterns of 
behaviour and creating a culture of nonviolent approaches that proposes an 
integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes in 
personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions” (United States Institute of 
Peace, 2011: 15-16). The concept of conflict transformation emerged in the 1990s as 
the world witnessed many civil wars that originated from old grievances. For 
Ramsbotham et al. (2009: 22), these conflict emergencies revealed the need for the 
transformation and (re)construction and/or a (re)conceptualisation of existing 
models of conflict intervention measures. After assessing their impact, a number of 
analysts arrived at the conclusion that existing conflict resolution mechanisms were 
ineffective in confronting this model of conflict development (Ramsbotham et al., 
2009: 5). Consequently, the introduction of a contemporary approach to conflict 
transformation in the field of peace studies adopted a more comprehensive structural 
and systematic approach (Ramsbotham et al., 2009: 23).  
 
Alluding to Väyrynen (1991), Botes (2001: 7) explains that the ‘micro’ perspective of 
conflict transformation entails transformational changes in the conflict behaviour of 
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disputing parties, while the ‘macro’ perspective carries the expectation that the socio-
political system within which the conflict is rooted undergoes complete transformation. 
For Lederach (2003: 14), conflict transformation means to “envision and respond to the 
ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change 
processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, 
and respond to real-life problems in human relationships”. This is an umbrella concept of 
intervention, which accentuates the need for constructive development and stresses the 
necessity of building peaceful relations that resonate with the overall goal of peace-
building. 
 
Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary General and one of the pioneer scholars in the study of 
peace-building, provided the first official definition of peace-building in the Agenda for 
Peace. He defined peace-building as, “an action to identify and support structures which 
tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 
11). Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 683) alluded to Lederach’s (2005) conception of 
peace-building as the capacity to conceive of and engender meaningful responses that are 
capable of resolving the incidence of violence and its recurrence in society. Such 
evolutionary and emancipatory concepts of conflict transformation and peace-building 
have occupied an important place in the debates on conflict and peace, and have added 
insight and depth to the conceptual framework of conflict intervention mechanisms.  
 
These theories have been expanded by transformation models such as the Ripe Moment 
approach of William Zartman; the Positive Peace and Negative Peace Paradigm of Johan 
Galtung; and the Eleven Points Model of Kumar Rupisinghe. These are discussed below, but 
are not considered suitable for managing the challenges that confront South Sudan. Given 
that the sustainability of peace in the aftermath of conflict is a very important aspect of 
conflict transformation, this section also examines John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model, 




William Zartman’s Ripe Moment Approach: Zartman, as cited in Logan & Croft (2004: 
2) maintains that there is a specific convenient and ripe moment where the conflicting 
parties reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, which renders them willing and ready to 
negotiate an end to the conflict. Amer (2007) observes that this approach seems to have 
been successful in Cambodia and Northern Ireland. However, two factors – the 
intractability of the Sudan–South Sudan conflict and the enormous challenges facing South 
Sudan prompt the following questions: When was the Sudan–South Sudan conflict right for 
mediation and when did the conflicting parties realise they were not achieving their goals 
and became unhappy with the conflict situation? Was it 17 years or 39 years into the 
conflict? When will South Sudan’s internal latent conflict and confrontations with the RoS 
be ripe for settlement? Will this be 15 months, two years or 10 years or more into the 
conflict? Who should intervene and what happens after the intervention?  
 
According to Doyle (2011: 4 & 7), a ‘moment’ of ripeness does not have the predictive 
capacity to signal which moment is right or not. Thus, Doyle (2011: 3) argues that “the 
conceptual category of ‘ripeness’ is indistinguishable from later success in a peace 
negotiation; and that even if it is separated conceptually there is no means of rigorously 
analysing whether perceptions of ripeness exist until after the fact.”  However, De Maio 
(2009: 155) argues that the Sudanese conflict reached a point where the conflicting parties 
were not achieving their goals and were exhausted from war. As a result, they welcomed 
peace (the signing of the 2005 CPA) as a means of re-establishing a stable and secure 
Sudan. While this may be true, only those close to the conflict can reasonably identify 
if/when they reach a mutually hurting stalemate. It has been noted that the peace-building 
process in the aftermath of war is very challenging, especially when episodes of renewed 
conflicts are increasing. Zartman, as referenced in Doyle & Sambanis (2000: 780-781) 
argues that achieving peace under these circumstances requires that central power be re-
concentrated; state legitimacy be increased through participation (elections, power 
sharing); economic resources be dedicated to support peace; and external and 
international assistance be present during the transitional period. While these suggestions 
are undoubtedly supportive of the need to build peace, Zartman does not expand on how 
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the processes should be carried on and what role the internal or local community should 
play during the transitional period and thereafter. 
 
Johan Galtung’s Positive Peace and Negative Peace Paradigm: Galtung is 
recognised as the pioneer of peace studies.  Galtung, as cited in Grewal (2003: 4) posits that 
peace research should address the narrow vision of ending or reducing violence at a direct 
or structural level and also seek to understand the conditions for preventing violence. He 
refers to negative peace as the absence of personal violence, characterised by a lack of 
destructive social and political tendencies and the absence of war. On the other hand,  
positive peace is the absence of structural violence, characterised by the presence of 
positive social and political trends such as justice, human rights, equality and well-being 
(Atack, 2009: 41 & 44). This implies that in the absence of “positive peace,” “negative 
peace” is challenged because war, armed conflict and political violence may be imminent. 
However, this depends on what is done to transform or alter the possibility of such an 
occurrence. As such, Galtung projects positive peace as a higher ideal than negative peace. 
   
Kenneth Boulding, as mentioned in Atack (2009: 41) critiques the theory of negative peace 
as abstruse, since peace does not merely imply the absence of war. Further alluding to Ian 
Harris, Atack (2009: 41 & 45) states that the presence of positive elements does not 
remove the causes of conflict. Furley and May (2006: 5) are of the opinion that negative 
peace, which proposes the absence of war, is overwhelmingly impracticable. This is 
illustrated by the fact that within a decade or so of the cessation of many African wars, 
conflict re-emerged (as was the case at the end of the Sudan-South Sudan first civil war). 
Furley and May (2006: 5) add that the construction of positive peace, which addresses the 
complex goals and misgivings of the conflicting parties goes far beyond dealing with 
prevailing political and economic differences. Rather, the challenge lies in addressing key 
elements like social reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, which Galtung (1998) 
observes are important for the attainment of a long-lasting and sustainable peace process 




The negative and positive peace theory is a good example of the different interpretations of 
peace and why it is important to adopt a broad focus in peace processes. While the concept 
of peace-building is said to have been introduced by Johan Galtung in 1975, his ‘tactical’ 
explanation of the concept in the form of the negative and positive peace perspective is 
extremely complex. Paffenholz, Abu-Nimer and McCandles (2005: 3) maintain that working 
towards positive peace involves processes that correspond with the notions of peace-
building and conflict transformation. That is to say, they involve activities aimed at 
impacting on the social and structural composition and relations of the post-conflict society 
through the involvement of various actors at different levels of the peace process. 
 
Kumar Rupisinghe’s Eleven Points Model: This model presents a comprehensive 
perspective of the conflict transformation theory. Rupisinghe’s model consists of 11 stages, 
covering pre-negotiation, root cause analysis and the ownership and actors involved in the 
peace process. This approach focuses on internal conflicts. It is multi-sectoral and 
promotes a national culture of peace from grassroots to national level (Gounden & 
Solomon, 1999: 4). It emphasises the importance of an inclusive approach to ensure that 
the actors involved in the transformation to peace reflect all the constituencies/groups in 
the conflict society. These groups have an interest in the peace. They are in fact the owners 
of the peace process, considering that the aim of negotiating transformation is to attain 
peace and build a sustainably peaceful and secure society (Gounden & Solomon, 1999: 7 & 
8). The rationale for this approach is also to prevent the escalation of conflict. Rupisinghe, 
as cited in Warfield and Jennings (2012: 21) maintains that the main objective of conflict 
prevention efforts should be the empowerment of local communities. This is because 
peace-building from below has the potential to strengthen local communities’ resources 
and capacity to work towards enhancing constructive and positive outcomes of various 
peace projects (Warfield & Jennings, 2012: 21). 
 
Although Rupisinghe’s model has certainly been useful in addressing conflict and post-
conflict situations in both South Africa and Mozambique, for example, his approach is 
limited by its lack of cultural perspective. South Sudan is a heterogeneous country and one 
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of its major challenges is the exclusion facing some communities and ethnic groups. As 
such, development efforts and the quest for sustainable peace will need to focus attention 
simultaneously on the advancement and reconciliation of state development and building a 
cohesive civilian culture and civil society. 
 
While the above approaches make valuable contributions to the theories of conflict 
transformation and peace, this study adopted John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model of 
conflict transformation. This model is used as a framework to link the theoretical aspects of 
the study with the research topic and questions on how to manage the challenges 
confronting South Sudan. Axt, Milososki and Schwarz (2006: 17) argue that the framework 
of conflict transformation has been predominantly fashioned by Lederach’s work since 
1995; his Pyramid Model has been a focal point of efforts to comprehensively manage 
conflict situations.  
 
John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model: The pyramid model, as proposed by Lederach, 
seeks to rebuild destroyed relationships, focusing on reconciliation and the fortification of 
a society’s long-term peace-building potential (Paffenholz & Spurk, 2006: 22). For 
Lederach, the relationship aspect is central to peace-building because conflicts are rooted 
in the breakdown of relationships and the potential of transforming conflicts lies in 
reconciling these relationships (Isike & Okeke-Uzodike, 2010: 687).  
 
Lederach conceptualises peace-building as the long-term transformation of a war system 
into a peace system. This requires constructive changes in the personal, structural, 
relational and cultural aspects of conflict over the short, medium and long terms (Miall, 
2004: 6). Thus, Lederach provides a substantive and analytical framework that addresses 
the need for a comprehensive and strategic approach to the transformation of deep-rooted 
conflicts, as well as an integrated framework for building peace and sustained 
reconciliation. He visualises peace-building as a structural process that allows the 
transformation of conflict to take place at three key levels of leadership, namely: top-level 
leadership (top-down approach); middle-level leadership (middle-out approach); and 
 
 19 
grassroots-level leadership (bottom-up approach) (Pillay, 2006: 55-56). This process aims 
to describe how peace should be built within the conflict-affected population, that is – “how 
the house of peace should be built” in war-torn societies (Lederach, 1997: 37). This 
framework is illustrated in the Diagram below. 
 
Diagram 1: Peace-building Levels in Conflict Societies: Actors and Approaches to Peace-
building — (Lederach, 1997: 39) 
 
 
As demonstrated above, the top level consists of key political and military leaders in the 
conflict and can be accessed by mediation at the level of states, which is advantageous for 
peace negotiations (Mischnick, 2007: 64; Document of the World Bank, 2006: 6). The 
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middle level is made up of people who are highly respected in society and who may be in 
formal leadership positions in sectors such as education, business or health or may be 
members of ethnic or religious groups within a community. The middle level leaders can be 
engaged through activities such as problem-solving workshops or peace commissions with 
the assistance of renowned local individuals in society. The grassroots level represents the 
majority of the population or the masses, and includes leaders who operate on a day-to-day 
basis, like leaders of a local NGO or a refugee camp; they can be reached through a wide 
range of peace-building approaches such as local peace commissions, community dialogue 
projects, or trauma healing (Document of the World Bank, 2006: 6; Paffenholz & Spurk, 
2006: 22). 
 
This model addresses and coordinates change at all three levels of society. It recognises the 
potential, importance, legitimacy, uniqueness, and interdependency of the needs and 
resources of civil society in their own peace-building processes, and promotes coordination 
across all levels and activities. As stated by Miall (2004: 6), the model also broadens the 
view of the conflict and the conflict parties and indicates the scope for drawing peace-
building resources from the wider society. It hinges on the fact that building mutual 
relationships is a pivotal part of the peace-building process. It credits the role of indigenous 
actors from within the conflict society and empowers and supports local efforts by 
engaging groups in different peace-building activities. Thus, this model of peace-building as 
proposed by Lederach seeks to bring civilians together through building trust; it requires 
and promotes intergroup communication, interaction and cooperation.  
 
The pyramid model proposes an integrated and analytical framework of the processes and 
goals of conflict transformation and peace-building, in both theory and practice. The model 
is posited as a policy alternative and recommended framework for the management of 
South Sudan’s challenges. This is due to the fact that it will enable the maximisation of 
efforts to address South Sudan’s development concerns and in the event of its 




1.8. Research Methodology and Design 
This study employed both historical and qualitative research techniques to unpack the 
challenges destabilising South Sudan’s constructive transition from war to peace and 
nation-building endeavours. According to Elena et al. (2011: 1), the historical research 
approach involves finding, using, and correlating information within primary and 
secondary sources, in order to communicate an understanding of past events. This research 
method enabled useful insight into phenomena through a careful assessment of narrative 
data collected on: the Sudan and South Sudan conflicts; attempts at intervention and the 
resulting outcomes; and the post-conflict challenges, peace-building and the associated 
development strategies. Thus, the use of the historical research method linked with the 
case study, which assisted in the design of specific research questions and the underlining 
research hypotheses that were derived from the historical review and analysis of 
information. Likewise, the rationale for the study’s use of the qualitative research method 
was to logically arrive at, and engender qualitative justifications of the “what and how” 
questions the study sought to answer. As stated by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) the 
qualitative method allows a researcher to unearth an immense amount of information.  
 
The existing or secondary sources the study used included the following:  a wide range of 
books and academic sources; government documents and reports; policy documents and 
published papers; newspaper and magazine articles and media reports; journal articles; 
published and unpublished theses; and information available on the Internet. To determine 
the validity of the data collected from the above documents, the study applied four of 
Scott’s (1990: 6) benchmarks for assessing the quality of the data sources. These included: 
 
1. Authenticity: whether the evidence gathered for the study is genuine and of 
unquestionable origin or sources; 
 




3. Representativeness: to establish the extent to which the evidence gathered is free of 
error and distortion, and whether the documents consulted are representative of 
the totality of the relevant documents; and 
 
4. Meaning: to establish the extent to which the evidence gathered is clear and 
comprehensible (Scott, 1990: 6). 
 
Primary sources included official Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), UN 
and AU documents; the memoranda of ceasefire and peace agreements (1972 and 2005 
peace accords, among others); and relevant documents on the Pyramid Model of conflict 
transformation as developed and articulated by Lederach and other peace and conflict 
scholars.  In light of South Sudan’s long-term development and peace-building challenges, 
the study used the Pyramid Model to address these complex issues. The use of this model 
provided new and unanticipated findings that offer prospects for establishing sustainable 
development and peace in South Sudan.  
 
Content analysis was used to analyse and adapt the information sourced from both 
secondary and primary documents. According to Elo and Kyngas (2008: 108) content 
analysis can be used for either qualitative or quantitative data. Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 
1277) add that it constitutes a very important part of the qualitative research approach and 
is used to construe meaning from the context of the data text. The content analysis 
approach was distinctly used owing to the fact that it involved the analysis and appraisal of 
existing literature on the Sudan–South Sudan conflict history, and the transformational and 
peace-building challenges that confront South Sudan. Basically, this approach facilitated 
understanding of, and vividly explicated pertinent primary and secondary information 
specific to the subject matter of the study.  
 
In the main, the use of these research methods expedited the researcher’s ability to 
illustrate different viewpoints on South Sudan. It also allowed for an assessment of South 




1.9. Limitations of the Study  
This study was confronted with a number of challenges. With South Sudan just having 
gained independence, there is a paucity of comprehensive scholarly literature on the 
research focus of this study. Geographical distance and time constraints did not allow for 
field research for primary data (interviews, questionnaires and/or surveys) collection 
purposes. Therefore, only the available documented primary and secondary data were 
used. Although useful, the use of existing or secondary sources could limit the relevance 
and accuracy of the information sourced. Since South Sudan is a young state, its history is 
also new, which provides opportunities for scholarly research and publications. The 
researcher consulted the relevant published material, which provided the background to 
the study’s research questions. Studies published after the completion of this study are 
therefore not germane to the analysis and conclusions reached by the researcher. 
 
1.10. Outline of the Study 
Chapter One: Introduction: An Orientation of the Research Theme. This chapter presents the 
background to the study and the research problem. It also outlines the research objectives 
and theoretical framework, the research methodology and design and the outline of the 
study.   
 
Chapter Two: A Historical Review of the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts and Peace Processes: 
This chapter provides a brief literature review and examines discourses on the root causes 
and nature of African conflicts. It explores the historical background to the North-South 
Sudan conflicts, their impact and the attempts at resolution. In terms of peace intervention 
measures, the chapter examines the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which ended the 
first civil war, and the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which put an end to the 
second civil war and opened up opportunities for political change. 
 
Chapter Three: South Sudan’s Post-conflict and Post-Independence Challenges: Exploring the 
Transformational and Peace-building Complexities. This chapter examines South Sudan’s 
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post-conflict/post-CPA challenges as well as the post-independence environment and its 
challenges. Since this is one of the main chapters of this study, the ‘post-post’ phases are 
examined, with particular focus on the post-independence period.  Challenges to South 
Sudan’s successful transformation and capacity to establish durable peace and 
development are addressed in this chapter. The chapter further evaluates the contributions 
of external and internal stakeholders in the enhancement of peace and development 
initiatives and the reasons why peace and development remain slow despite the supportive 
efforts of the various actors.  
 
Chapter Four: Framework for Managing South Sudan’s Challenges: An Application of 
Lederach’s Pyramid Model: This chapter focuses on how South Sudan’s challenges can be 
managed. It provides policy recommendations inspired by John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid 
Model, which emphasises the importance of coordinating peace-building activities across 
all levels of society in order to build a relationship of trust, respect, cooperation and 
cohesion. Specific policy recommendations that aim to address the major challenges 
identified and discussed are proposed.  
 
Chapter Five: Summary, Findings and Conclusion: Reflecting on the research questions, 
hypotheses and objectives, this chapter again underscores the importance of healing 
broken relationships and building trust as the way forward in achieving viable peace and 
development, national and societal cooperation and harmony in South Sudan. It summarise 




Challenges to transforming the Sudan–South Sudan post-independence conflict and 
enhancing the development of a peaceful and stable South Sudan constitute major 
drawbacks to South Sudan's efforts to move forward. The significant change in the Sudan–
South Sudan conflict dynamics, subsequent to South Sudan’s secession and attainment of 
independence from Sudan, and the quest of South Sudan to establish a peaceful nation-
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state continue to encounter a multitude of political and socio-economic obstacles. In an 
attempt to examine the transformational and peace-building challenges, this chapter has 
provided a general background to the research, laid a framework for the study's relevance, 
spelled out the driving research questions and the theoretical approaches adopted to 
address and recommend mechanisms for managing South Sudan’s post-conflict and post-
independence problems. Likewise, the framework is formulated to investigate the 
relevance of the research hypotheses and the lacunae which the study contends to fill in the 
growing literature of conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan. Against 
this backdrop, the next chapter engages in extensive literature review and discourses, 
unpacking the historical evolution of the Sudan–South Sudan’s conflict and peace 
processes, as a prelude to provide a clearer insight and comprehension of South Sudan’s 




2. A Historical Review of the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts 
and Peace Processes 
2.1. Introduction  
This chapter analyses the fundamentals of the Sudan–South Sudan first civil war (1955-
1972) and second civil war (1983-2005) and offers a comprehensive delineation of their 
complex and widespread development and consequences. This historical background is 
important because it will provide a perspective of South Sudan’s conflict trajectory. An 
analysis and understanding of the multi-faceted challenges confronting South Sudan as a 
post-conflict and a sovereign state (see chapter three), would be incomplete without an 
examination of their origins and context. Considering the prolonged nature of the Sudan-
South Sudan conflict, the ‘conflict’ is briefly discussed and the Sudan-South Sudan conflict is 
contextualised within the framework of protracted conflict.  
 
Generally, conflict is a unique occurrence that is defined by distinct characteristics. It 
constitutes a natural part of human existence and has historically defined the landscape of 
most countries across the globe. According to Bartos and Wehr (2002: 6) conflict and 
change are as inherent in the social world as order and permanence. This underscores that 
there is a congruent relationship between conflict and change. For Ramsbotham et al. 
(2009: 28) conflict denotes the quest for irreconcilable goals and objectives by different 
groups exercised through the use of force. Isike and Okeke-Uzodike (2010: 682) 
conceptualise conflict simply as the breakdown of relationships, while for Miller (2005: 
22), “conflict may be either manifest, recognisable through actions or behaviours, or latent, 
in which case it remains dormant for some time, as incompatibilities are unarticulated or 
are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations, or 
even civil society.” Reychler (2001: 5) also asserts that conflicts occur as a result of 
different groups pursuing incompatible goals and its outbreak into violence is 
preconditioned by four factors: (1) the interdependent parties, who (2) experience the 
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interdependence as negative, and (3) have the opportunity to use violence, and (4) 
consider the use of violence the most cost-effective policy option. This therefore, implies 
that conflicts only become a hindrance when they resort to the use of violence.  
 
According to Bujra (2002: 16), citing Adebayo Adedeji (1999), conflicts are generally 
triggered by a multitude of factors that have deep political, economic, social and cultural 
causes. Bannon and Collier (2003: 7) argue that states with natural and economic 
resources have the propensity to resort to conflict and contestation over such resources. 
Over and above the fact that resources engender and sustain conflicts, they also have the 
potential to destabilise governance and lead to famines, the spread of disease, population 
displacement, and serious environmental damage. Clover (2004: 7-8) contends that 
conflicts are caused by the pursuit of national and indigenous self-rule, ethnic tensions and 
political disputes. These are driven by socio-economic and political grievances, poverty, 
poor governance and disparities in economic and social development. Oyeniyi (2012: 3-4) 
posits that historical legacies of inter-state boundaries inherited from colonialism on the 
one hand and the multi-ethnic character of most African states on the other, are conflict 
enabling factors said to define the nature of conflicts in Africa.   
 
Dudouet (2006: 3-4) states that conflicts characterised by ideological, political, resources 
and ethnic identity issues have a greater propensity to be protracted and last for many 
decades. According to Azar (1990), conflicts that are marked by the above enabling factors 
tend to be protracted and remain defined by the issues and dynamics of the conflict 
relations (Nilsson & Kreutz 2010: 3). These include conflicts over resource-rich or geo-
strategic territories that are prolonged as a result of the conflict parties’ disinclination to 
retract; and dynamics such as the control and domination of state institutions by a certain 
ethnic or regional community or group to the exclusion of the others (Nilsson & Kreutz, 
2010: 3). Protracted conflicts are characterised by various types of inequalities – economic, 
social, political and cultural (Stewart, 2011: 2). The historical causes of the Sudan-South 
Sudan conflicts, as will be demonstrated, were a blend of these issues and dynamics, some 




In line with the above context, this chapter aims to answer important questions such as: 
what factors prompted the conflicts’ persistence? And, what was the magnitude of the 
conflict and its impact on the emerging nation of South Sudan? As noted by Michailof, 
Kostner, and Devictor (2002: 2), understanding the causes, characteristics and impact of 
conflicts in Africa is a fundamental prerequisite to being able to resolve them. Taking 
cognisance of this fact, further questions include, but are not limited to: what conflict 
resolution attempts were made over the decades and how did these influence or alter the 
nature of the conflict? How did the conflict evolve? What were the political, economic and 
social conditions associated with the agreement(s)? Given these questions, the chapter 
further evaluates the methods and nature of the peace processes in Sudan, alongside 
overall regional and international efforts and reactions to the successive conflicts. This 
includes an examination of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which ended the first 
civil war but fell short of instituting mechanisms for its implementation, and the 2005 CPA 
as the significant qualitatively superior peace development that ended the second civil war 
and created a window of opportunity for South Sudan to transition to a historical era free 
of violent conflict.  
 
2.2. Deconstructing the Sudan-South Sudan Conflicts 
The Republic of Sudan has endured civil wars and armed conflicts for several decades. In 
the wake of its independence from Anglo-Egyptian rule in 1956, Sudan was already 
embroiled in a conflict that later became known as the first Sudanese civil war. According 
to Johnson (2003: 21), this was the first of its kind in post-colonial Africa. While a 
settlement was reached in 1972, the 11-year period of peace was broken by the outbreak of 
a second civil war in 1983, which lasted until 2005. The Sudanese civil wars caused 
tremendous suffering, destruction, loss of human lives and displacement of people. At this 
present time, South Sudan's complex conflict dynamics can be explained by the social 
composition of the two regions of the former Sudan, the power relations, and the 
limitations on the part of the Sudanese government to fully understand the resolve of the 
South Sudanese to reclaim their rights.  
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Below is a map of the Republic of Sudan at independence in 1956.  The Map is illustrative of 
the different regions – North and South, and its border countries.  
 
Map 1: Map of Sudan at Independence on January 1, 1956.  
 
Source: US Department of State, 2005: http://www.state.gov/cms_images/sudan_map.jpg. Along 
the lines, as visibly indicated on the map, lies the colonial border delimiting the Southern Sudan 
region from the broader Sudan at the time of independence from the British. This 1956 boundary 
demarcation remained among the driving factors behind the Sudan-South Sudan decades-long 
history of violent conflict.    
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2.2.1. The causes and implications of the first civil war: 1955-1972 
The origins of the first Sudanese civil war can be traced as far back as the period prior to 
British colonization that later extended to the legacy of expatriate Anglo-Egyptian 
domination. During the pre- and post-independence Sudan revolution, these two regions 
were broadly described as the Arab-Muslim North and the African-Christian/Animist 
South, or simply put, the North Sudan-South Sudan conflict (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
27). According to Kulusika (1998: 36), the roots of Sudan’s problems can be traced to the 
sale and enslavement of indigenous black Africans  by the Arabs long before the Sudanese 
state was demarcated into Northern and Southern groups by the Turkish-Egyptian 
colonialists from 1821-1885. This delineation was subsequently reinforced by the Anglo-
Egyptian regime; from 1898 to 1956, where the British administered two distinct policies 
in a single colonial entity (Kulusika, 1998: 36).  
 
Jacon et al. (2012: 498) note that the administration of Sudan as two distinct policy entities 
created a huge divergence between the Northern and Southern territories. Firstly, in terms 
of religion, the British encouraged the Southern Sudanese to embrace Christianity and 
dissuaded them from taking up or practicing the Islamic culture. Secondly, the British 
invested little in the educational needs of the Southerners, which limited their capacity to 
engage in political affairs. This was not the case in the North, where the elites were given 
education and enabled to defend the independence of the country (Jacon et al., 2012: 498). 
Moreover, during the Turkish-Egyptian era as well as Anglo-Egyptian rule, the Northern 
part of Sudan benefited tremendously from large scale economic investments, such as the 
introduction of modern irrigation systems for cotton plantations and the economic 
ecosystem that developed around the booming cotton industry, trade, transportation and 
employment; while in the Southern part, the indigenous economy was left largely 




Kulusika (1998: 36 – 37) notes that the fact that Sudan was presented de facto as two 
distinct entities was made manifest in the Southern Policy3 of British rule in the 1930s. This 
policy was replaced by ‘Sudanisation’4 in 1946, which aimed at integrating the Anglo-
Egyptian administered Northern territory and the British governed Southern region under 
one government (Sawant, 1998: 350; Gadir, Elbadawi & El-Batahani, 2005: 7). Gadir  et al. 
(2005: 5-6) further stress that this policy was not the first of its kind, since a number of 
memoranda dating back to 1918 and 1921 had suggested the linkage and integration of 
Southern Sudan with Central African administrative systems of rule rather than with 
Northern Sudan.   
 
According to Ryan (2012: 9), the endorsement of the policy of ‘Sudanisation’ in the 1947 
Juba Conference was backed by a number of promises from the Northern region to the 
Southern region, mainly to gain the support of Southern Sudanese for the idea of a united 
Sudan at the dawn of independence. Scholars like Malwal (1987), as mentioned in Gadir et 
al (2005: 8) also maintain that the unity settlement was based on certain provisions, which 
included: the demand by Southerners for the respect, preservation, and promotion of 
Southern cultures (languages, traditions and heritage); reconciliation of the poor relations 
between the two regions and a commitment to the equality of citizens in the future Sudan; 
racial equality; accelerated educational and economic development in the South; and the 
                                                          
3The Southern Policy aimed at extricating the South from the North and incorporating and developing it along 
the culture of Africanism and Christianity rather than Arabisation and Islamisation. This declaration to rule 
the South differently from the North therefore suggested the development of a southern Sudan state 
alongside countries in British East Africa, rather than the Middle East (Johnson, 2003: 11).  
4The new version of the Southern Policy read thus: “[W]e should now work on the assumption that the Sudan, 
as at present constituted, with possibly minor boundary adjustment, will remain one: and we should 
therefore restate our Southern Policy and do so publicly, as follows: ‘the policy of the Sudan government 
regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the fact that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively 
African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be foreseen at the present 
time) to render them inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and arabicised 
Northern Sudan: and therefore to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be 
equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of 
the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future” (Gadir et al., 2005: 7-8), quoting Beshir,  (1968), The Southern 




involvement of Southerners in the administration of the country at the national level 
coupled with self-rule in Southern Sudan. Despite these conditions, the Southerners still 
had reservations, especially regarding their vision of assuming political control within the 
South Sudan territory after independence. The exclusion of Southern representatives from 
the 1953 elections on the future of Sudan and the influx of Northerners to replace positions 
vacated by departing British administrators, educators, senior officers, military and 
business positions in the South, confirmed the worst fears of the Southern Sudanese 
(Johnson, 2003: 27). Johnson adds that the reason for such anxiety among Southern 
Sudanese was attributable, first to the fact that the Southern Sudanese had little or no 
representation in the national parliament, and second, that Northern Sudanese were 
appointed not only to key, but all the senior positions in the South.  
 
This evidence of Northern domination and the marginalisation of Southerners long before 
independence prompted Southern Sudanese to engage in political action, inter alia violent 
demonstrations, leading to the 1955 Torit Massacre, which set the stage for the first Sudan 
civil war (Paglia, 2007: 4). It also prompted the South to form political groups, such as the 
Southern Liberal Party (SLP) to demand federalism after independence and to fight for the 
recognition of the Southern Sudanese identity within its political zone (LeRiche & Arnold, 
2012: 13). At independence on January 1, 1956, there was still no agreement between the 
North and the South, especially on the issue of federalism and Southern involvement in the 
political and economic affairs of independent Sudan. These problems as well as the open 
conflict between the Arab North and the African South resulted in the formation of rebel 
groups like the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) – a unit of Anya Nya 
Guerrillas and its political wing – and the Southern Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) in 1963; 
these groups orchestrated attacks in several provinces like Wau and Juba; the coup d’état 
against General Ibrahim Abbud’s government in 1965; and the 1969 coup that brought 
General Jaaffer Nimeiri to power. All these actions caused the further escalation of war 
(Sawant, 1998: 353-354; Plagia, 2007: 4). 
 
Given the above, scholars like Yokwe (1997: 82) have attributed the causes of the civil war 
to the struggles for power and the quest for autonomy by the Christian and animist south 
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from the Khartoum government. This first civil war created a period of turmoil that lasted 
until 1972. It can be concluded that the problem of a prosperous Arab North and a 
neglected Christian South fundamentally divided by a number of historical, religious, 
political, economic and socio-cultural issues and events was at the heart of the violent 
conflict. The interest of the North not only in retaining political, economic and social 
control of the country, but to completely exclude and deprive the South, pushed the 
Southern Sudanese to swiftly resort to the politics of war. The signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement in 1972 ended the conflict and ushered in 11 years of peace. However, the lack 
of substance and shallowness of the agreement, the non-compliance of the Khartoum 
government in upholding even the most basic tenets of its terms and provisions and the 
daunting challenges of implementation were all causes of the re-emergence of violent 
conflict in 1983. 
  
2.2.2. The causes and implications of the second civil war: 1983-2005 
The violent outbreak of conflict in Sudan in 1983 marked the second phase of the Sudanese 
civil war. A number of unresolved differences, events and the policies adopted by President 
Nimeiri’s government led to the collapse of the 1972 agreement and are said to have 
triggered the conflict (Ryan, 2012: 11). The first such event was the removal of Islamic 
provisions from the 1973 Constitution by President Nimeiri’s administration in order to 
comply with one of the provisions of the Addis Ababa Agreement with the South (Sawant, 
1998: 355). This caused widespread rebellion among the Northern Arabs. Likewise, the 
provision which called for the South to be afforded the political right to self-govern their 
region was contested and viewed by some Northern elites as constituting a threat to 
Sudan’s future and their existing political privileges (Ryan, 2012: 10).  
 
The majority of the Anya Nya rebels expressed dissatisfaction with the peace process and 
did not share the idea of a united Sudan. This eventually resulted in the breakup of the 
movement, leading to formation of Anya Nya II whose main objective was Southern 
autonomy rather than unity (Johnson, 2003: 60). Furthermore, the problems over certain 
borders like Abyei, the Chali area of the Blue Nile and the Kafia Kingi and Hofrat al-Nahas 
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areas, also proved triggers for conflict. Johnson (2003: 44) notes that some of these areas, 
like Abyei and Chali area of the Blue Nile were part of the South until 1953, but were 
undefined when Sudan gained independence in 1956. While the 1972 peace agreement 
provided for their transfer back to the Southern region, there was great reluctance on the 
part of the government to implement this provision because of its interest in the water and 
mineral resources in the areas (Johnson, 2003: 44). 
 
The discovery of oil in the south of Sudan in 1976 also exacerbated tensions in the region, 
especially since the Southern government were not consulted or included in the decision-
making processes and negotiations that led to the drilling and extraction of the oil by 
international companies like Chevron and Total (Ryan, 2012: 10).  Ryan adds that the 
scarcity of water in the Northern region and the proposal to build the Jonglei Canal to 
direct water resources to the North was an added source of tension between the North and 
the South. According to Johnson (2003: 45), South Sudan's main asset was oil, mostly 
located in the Upper Nile and Jonglei provinces; and the numerous tributaries of the Nile 
River and heavier rainfall in Southern Sudan also gives the region better access to water 
compared with the then North Sudan that relied on perennial and seasonal rivers, 
originating in neighbouring countries (OCHA, 2006).  This abundance of resources in the 
South was the cause of the major divide between it and the North. The North’s 
determination to control these resources and the South’s keenness to retain control 
provoked the hostilities and remained at the heart of the North-South Sudan conflict's 
intractability.  
 
Furthermore, new developments in the 1980s such as the government’s decision to 
proceed with the Jonglei Canal project despite opposition from the South, led to a series of 
attacks by the Anya Nya against Sudan troops (Sawant, 1998: 356). Hoile (2002: 33) also 
notes that the arrest of 21 Southern politicians accused of illegally forming the Council for 
Unity of Southern Sudan (CUSS) party in 1982 provided further grounds for tension in 
Southern Sudan. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), mostly composed of 
members of the Dinka ethnic group, was formed in 1982. Its objective was to overthrow 
Arab rule and create a united Sudan, as opposed to the ideology of the Anya Nya 
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(predominantly from the Nuer population) who advocated for an independent Southern 
Sudan (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 16-17).  These conflicting visions for Southern Sudan’s 
future also provoked divisions in the South, especially between the Dinka and Nuer 
populations, which led to individuals advocating for the prevention of the South's 
domination by the Dinka.  
 
According to LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 58), the government of Sudan’s repeal of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement; the re-division of Southern Sudan into three separate regions:  
Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile; and the implementation of Islamic Sharia law in 
all regions of the country, including Southern Sudan in 1983, are the three major policies 
that incited and marked the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. This war, 
spearheaded and led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and its military wing, the 
SPLA (SPLM/A) under the leadership of Dr John Garang came to an end only in 2005 with 
the signing of the CPA.  
 
From 1983 to 2005, many other factors and incidents contributed to the escalation and 
protracted nature of this conflict. External support for the government and rebel groups in 
the South – from the United States of America (USA), Libya, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Uganda, Kenya, Central Africa Republic and the DRC and the spread of the conflict to other 
regions of Sudan promoted the conflict (Johnson, 2003: 67). The deteriorating political and 
economic situation in the country that led to Nimeiri’s overthrow in 1985; the 1989 coup 
that brought Omar Bashir to power as the president of Sudan, and the Sudan government’s 
re-launch of the war led by the army, which ended ongoing reconciliation efforts between 
the SPLM/A and several Northern opposition parties, also exacerbated the conflict (Sawant, 
1998: 357; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 77). The lack of unity within the SPLM/A also 
precipitated violence in Southern Sudan. The coup against the SPLM/A leadership of John 
Garang in 1991 split the movement into factions, the SPLA-Nasir in 1991 and the SPLA-
United (later renamed the Southern Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A)) in 
1993. This also led to widespread unrest between the fragmented groups as well as attacks 
on villages and communities within the Southern regions (Johnson, 2003: 98; LeRiche & 
Arnold, 2012: 85). It further generated the ‘conflict of ethnic politics’ that led to the 
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intensification of inter-ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer, described as one of the 
worst and bloodiest conflicts in the history of Southern Sudan (New Sudan Council of 
Churches, 1999). While both communities had been fighting for years over issues related to 
grazing land and cattle raiding, the new inter-tribal and inter-factional disputes 
increasingly targeted women and children (New Sudan Council of Churches, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, Southern Sudan's discontent spiraled into political dissonance over access to 
power, lack of respect as an ethnic group/s, being deprived of opportunities and the 
distribution of resources, and encapsulated a complex conflict over ethnic, religious and 
cultural identity and extensive rivalry over water, land and oil resources (Goldsmith, Abura 
& Switzer, 2002: 190). Although Southern Sudan is said to have been at the heart of the 
civil wars because of the momentum it gathered for its strong opposition as early as 1955 
(the Torit Mutiny), other conflicts linked to ethnic identity had simmered and continue to 
do so today in the peripheral regions of the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, 
Eastern Sudan, and Darfur, contributing to the instability and humanitarian crisis in Sudan 
(Kameir, 2011: 4).   
 
While a settlement was reached in 2005, the war already had devastating consequences. 
According to Peters (1996: 9) the conflicts caused the South to remain perhaps the most 
underdeveloped area not only in Sudan, but in the whole of Africa. It also resulted in gross 
violations of human rights; led to the genocide of defenceless civilians in towns, villages 
and refugee camps (mostly in South Sudan); and the abduction and torture of women and 
children as well as  Southern politicians (Yokwe, 1997: 97-98). Mears and Watt (2011: 1-2) 
note that the conflict resulted in the displacement of more than four million people and 
approximately two million deaths; about 50,000 children were orphaned and another 
17,000 were recruited into armed groups. Other consequences included poverty, famine, 
starvation and food insecurity; and the disruption of basic social services (Government of 
the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 5 & 8). It also led to the destruction of the little 
infrastructure that existed in the South, such as hospitals, schools and roads; and weakened 
the existing socio-economic systems, as well as state administration and institutions 




Whereas the foregoing historical analysis points to economic and political inequities, as 
well as the perpetual violation of the basic rights of the South Sudanese by the North in the 
former Sudan as drivers of the conflict, the root causes that confined these inequities to the 
Southern region, remain apparent. The Horizontal Inequalities Model however, offers an 
alternative explanation of the causes underlying such inequalities. Østby (2003: 24) 
contends that "incompatible interests may be the apparent cause of conflict among groups 
in many cases, but conflict, arguably, will not occur in the absence of some inter-group 
identity competition.” Even though this does not imply that conflict is an evitable outcome 
of inter-group differences, Tajfel and Turner (1986), as cited in Østby (2003: 24) postulate 
that inter-group conflicts are prompted and enhanced even where the groups have 
compatible interests, and that this is common where one group’s “action for positive 
distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded or in any way actively prevented by an out-group.”  
 
This model brings to the surface the fact that the ethnic distinctness between Northern 
Sudan and Southern Sudan regions defined the conflict; these ethnic variations continue to 
influence Sudan (with the crises in Darfur and Kordofan) and have cascaded into the 
political landscape of independent South Sudan.  The application of the Horizontal 
Inequalities Model to the conflict clarifies that internally, neither the Northern Sudan nor 
the Southern Sudan regions were ethnically homogenous but that the Northern Sudan 
region – save for marginal dissenters – was united in supporting the Khartoum 
government's policies that the Southern Sudanese opposed.  Likewise, the Southern 
Sudanese were, despite their broad ethnic diversity, equally exposed to the Khartoum 
government's unfavourable policies as well as united in opposing them. Given this, one can 
contend that the same identity-related unresolved causes of the first civil war reignited the 
second civil war, with the only difference being that the dashed expectations created by the 
1972 Addis Ababa Agreement also added to the resolve of the South Sudanese never to 
settle for quasi- and half-baked solutions – as demonstrated in the Comprehensive Peace 




Furthermore, although competition for resources added another dimension to the conflict, 
it sprang (and continues to do so) from the inequalities along ethnic lines that contributed 
to the prolonged conflict in the first place. These inequalities have in the post-conflict 
setting continued to cause internal conflicts within South Sudan as well as with Sudan. On 
this note it can be argued that the inequalities between ethnic groups that stood at the 
heart of the first Sudanese civil war also expressed and manifested themselves in 
economic/resource inequalities, which further perpetuated a sense of domination by the 
advantaged Northern Sudan entities, and a sense of marginalisation by the disadvantaged 
Southern Sudanese. This situation likewise created a cycle where the Northern Sudan and 
Southern Sudan entities, as well as communities within South Sudan were/are set apart by 
their differences. The identities of the Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan districts as 
distinct entities either benefitting from or disadvantaged by unbalanced power relations 
reveal the causes of the first and second civil wars in the former Sudan, even if the issue 
that sparked the wars appear to vary. The fact that Sudan has grappled with ethnic-based 
problems (manifest in political, economic and social differences) in a greater part of its 
post-independence history, including the period following the independence of South 
Sudan in July 2011 – suggests that identity-based (ethnic) inequalities lie at the root of the 
Sudan–South Sudan conflict, and are latent in the challenges of inter- and intra-ethnic 
harmony in the Republic of South Sudan.   
  Summary Causes of the Sudan–South Sudan Conflict — Identity (Ethnic)-Based Inequalities 
further manifested in Political, Economic and Social Inequalities 
 
 Identity-based political inequalities in the control of political power by Khartoum government 
(dominantly North Sudanese) to the exclusion of the South, equating the unequal distribution of 
political power between the North and the South — thus, concerns of poor governance and 
corruption, and competition for political opportunities /power and participation in political 
affairs by the South. 
 
 Identity-based economic inequalities in the South’s unequal access to employment 
opportunities, thus the issue of poverty, and unequal distribution of resources, especially 
following the discovery of oil in the south of Sudan in 1976; the numerous tributaries of the Nile 
River and heavier rainfall in Southern Sudan, providing the South with better access to water 
compared to the then North Sudan — thus the North’s determination to control these resources 
and the South’s keenness to retain control 
 Identity-based social inequalities in the South — as observed in the unequal  access to health, 
educational and other infrastructural facilitiesas compared to the North, and the nation-wide 





2.3. Peace Processes and Negotiations to end the Sudan-South Sudan 
Conflicts 
This section examines the nature of peace processes and negotiations to address the 
Sudan-South Sudan conflicts. According to Peters (1996: 4) a large part of Sudan’s conflict 
history, particularly the period following the outbreak of the first civil war, remained 
overlooked by the outside world. Attempts to find a solution to Sudan’s first civil war were 
mainly directed by the government and rebel groups. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 
February 27, 1972 proved to be a complicated undertaking, which ended the violent 
conflict but encountered serious implementation challenges. However, the agreement was 
considered unique in being the first of its kind in post-colonial Africa (Johnson: 2003: 39).  
Unlike the first civil war, the second civil war was characterised by the continuing 
commitment of international negotiators, spearheaded by IGAD.5  While peace efforts 
initially incited more violence, the mediating parties remained instrumental in assisting 
Sudan-South Sudan in reaching a political and negotiated solution to the crisis. This 
eventually resulted in the 2005 CPA, which has been credited as a significant marker that 
transformed the conflict, mapped the end of 22 years of instability, spurred the secession of 
the South from the North, and set the stage for the creation of newly autonomous Republic 
of South Sudan. 
 
2.3.1. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement 
President Nimeiri’s public declaration of the government’s willingness to work for social 
justice for all Sudanese, including Southerners and, the drafting of a policy statement to this 
                                                          
5IGAD is a sub-regional organisation with members from seven states in East Africa and the Horn of Africa 
(Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Eritrea).  IGAD was formerly the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), established as an economic community in 1986 to deal with 
environmental problems such drought and desertification. However, it later assumed the additional role of 





effect just after he assumed power in 1969, created the basis for the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (Shinn, 2005: 240). The policy, which comprised three major elements, in 
theory attempted to address the consequences of the horizontal inequalities to which the 
Southern Sudanese were subjected:  
 
1. The new revolutionary government acknowledged the extent and degree of the 
Southern grievances, as resulting from the legacy of uneven development between 
the Northern and the Southern regions of Sudan and was determined to find a 
lasting solution to the problem. 
 
2. The government also recognised the existing cultural and historical differences 
between the North and South and as a result afforded Southerners the right to 
regional autonomy and to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a 
united Sudan. 
 
3. The amnesty law would be extended to develop the South, appoint a Minister of 
Southern Affairs and call on all Southerners to build a united and democratic Sudan, 
as a mechanism to achieve the first two goals (Shinn, 2005: 240). 
 
Negotiations over the proposals for regional autonomy and dialogue to end the violence 
between the government and the SSLM/SSLA were mediated by the late Emperor Haile 
Selassie of Ethiopia (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 27). These discussions culminated in the 
signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement between the second military regime of General 
Nimeiri’s Khartoum government and the SSLM/SSLA and ended 17 years of conflict. Some 
of the key points of the signed agreement included: 
 
1. A Regional Assembly would be elected as a legislature based in Juba and a High 
Executive Council (HEC) as a Southern Regional Government (SRG) exercising 
executive powers in addition to an independent civil service commission. This 
meant that Southern Sudan would be represented as a single and distinct entity 




2. The Regional Assembly could also vote to request the President of the nation to 
exempt the Southern region from any national legislation it considered detrimental 
to regional interests (Johnson, 2003: 40); 
 
3. The Southern areas outside the formally defined South, particularly Abyei, would 
have referenda regarding inclusion in the South; 
 
4. The Anya Nya insurgents would be integrated into the national army and comprise 
half of a ‘Southern Command’ that would be subordinated and answerable to 
command in Khartoum; and 
 
5. The SRG could raise revenue and local tariffs, but not engage in economic planning, 
as the President of the country retained the final authority over economic matters 
(LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 27). 
 
Many Southerners regarded this agreement as violating the original goal of Southern 
independence. Irrespective of these concerns, the agreement was ratified in March 1972 
and later enshrined in the new national constitution of the Southern Sudan Regional Self-
Government Act in May 1973 (Johnson, 2003: 41). Gadir Ali (2003: 3) maintains that under 
this agreement the South was privileged to have self-sufficient democratic governance in 
contrast to the rest of the country. For LeRiche and Arnold (2012: 28), the agreement 
simply addressed a few key Southern concerns and did not bring to the South the necessary 
development they had been deprived of by the British and Northern politicians or the 
reconstruction of whatever meager infrastructure they had, which had been destroyed 
during the conflict (Ryan, 2012: 11).  
 
The re-emergence of conflict in 1983 pointed to the consequences of not abiding to, or 
successfully implementing the peace agreement. As noted earlier, the failure of this conflict 
resolution attempt was directly linked to a series of events that instigated a relapse into 
conflict. It can also be contended that the failure of the agreement and the eventual 
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outbreak of the second civil war was a result of its shallowness, as illustrated in the above 
provisions. Thus, despite the fact that it was symbolic, the Addis Ababa Agreement was not 
sufficiently complete to address the distinct needs of the Southern Sudanese for fair and 
equal treatment and the desire of the Khartoum government to perpetuate its dominance 
at the expense of the Southern region. This lack of commitment on the part of both parties 
led to the collapse of the agreement. The failure to address the issues of underdevelopment 
that had plagued the South since colonialism created a ripe socio-economic and political 
situation to spark another conflict. 
 
According to David Malone,6 the reasons for the failure and the challenges in implementing 
peace agreements can be attributed to three factors:  insufficient time for peace accords to 
translate into meaningful actions; hasty steps taken to implement the agreement without 
studying or understanding the vulnerability of the conflict environment and/or putting in 
place constructive and strategic plans to manage imminent challenges (Stedman, 2001: 1). 
In the cases of Angola and Rwanda for example, such failure to implement peace 
agreements resulted in the most catastrophic violence ever witnessed by both countries 
(Cousens, 2002: 2); this was also the case with Sudan.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, John Paul Lederach attributes such failures to the 
limitations of the conflict resolution mechanism. In his view, the conflict resolution 
approach merely aims to source immediate solutions to end conflicts rather than engaging 
in long-term processes to understand the root causes of the conflict and pursue 
constructive change (Ramsotham et al., 2009: 8 & 332). This conforms with Ryan’s (2012: 
11) assertion that although the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement may have yielded the desired 
outcome of ending the immediate violence, it failed to address the root causes of the 
conflict.  
 
                                                          
6 David M. Malone is a Canadian author and career diplomat. He is the former President of the International 
Peace Institute (IPI), an expert in International Affairs and has authored several books on International 




It is also important to note that between the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the 2005 
CPA several attempts aimed at addressing and achieving reconciliation were initiated in 
Sudan. The document ‘the chronology of the Sudanese peace processes’ specifies that about 
18 different ventures aimed at reconciling the various Sudan conflicts were signed between 
1989 and 2001 (Hoile, 2002). Collins (2007) further elucidates that in 2002 and 2003, 16 
different efforts at resolving the Sudan conflicts were reached; with 15 in 2004.  
 
2.3.2. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
The rapid rise to prominence of the second Sudanese civil war on the agendas of 
governments and regional and international organisations provided the platform for the 
international community to undertake a series of diplomatic initiatives to broker peace in 
Sudan. According to Johnson (2003: 101), serious talks to broker peace between the 
Northern and Southern Sudan regions began in 1992 with the Abuja Agreement. While no 
conclusions were reached on this agreement, it stirred an interest in further external 
involvement and established the need for intervening actors to intensify and engage in 
constructive settlement strategies under the patronage of IGAD.7 IGAD’s involvement in 
creating a diplomatic climate of change in the Sudanese conflict began in 1993, marking the 
beginning of efforts for more pre-emptive African regional institutions and actors with 
both the political will and capacity to manage African conflicts (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 
101). From the beginning of the 21st century, these efforts, with the support of Western 
powers, resulted in a series of peace negotiations that culminated in the signing of the CPA. 
 
Initially faced with a number of challenges, IGAD-led negotiations in 1994 resulted in the 
drafting of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which recommended the right of Southern 
autonomy, while upholding the fact that the unity of Sudan remained a priority; and also 
                                                          
7 IGAD-led initiatives were made possible through the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU’s) efforts to 
develop mechanisms for the mediation of internal conflicts in Africa (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 94). While the 
OAU/African Union (AU) did not feature much in the peace discussions to end the North-South Sudan second 
civil war, it remained a political will behind IGAD and fully supported its initiative. Thus, it can be said that 
the importance of IGAD’s role in addressing the protracted conflict by extension represented the objectives 




pronounced the need for the establishment of a secular and democratic society throughout 
the country (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 107). This declaration was supported by the SPLM/A, 
but spurned by the Government of Sudan (GoS) who nonetheless sanctioned it as a 
backdrop for dialogue to broker peace with the South in 1997 (Shinn, 2005: 239; Iyob & 
Khadiagala, 2006: 105 & 106). Thus, the DoP became the basis for IGAD’s future 
negotiations with the conflicting Sudanese parties. Despite the more positive attitude  of 
the GoS, the implementation and development of the DoP faced serious challenges, 
especially in light of the ruling National Congress Party's (NCP) constant attempts to 
renegotiate its terms; the rising tensions between the warring factions and the ethnic 
divisions within the Southern parties and communities, as well as between Egypt-Libya 
and IGAD; and the problems of famine, warfare and drought in the South that surpassed the 
intervention (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006: 111; LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 107).  
 
At the turn of the 21st century, IGAD’s efforts received strong support from President 
Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi of Kenya and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF)8. Furthermore, the 
USA focused its support and efforts on securing a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains that 
began in 2001. With such backing, IGAD’s position was greatly strengthened and in July 
2002, there was a breakthrough in its peace efforts when the GoS and SPLM/A signed the 
Machakos Protocol under the guardianship and encouragement of President Moi and 
General Lazarus Sumbeiywo of Kenya (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 108). This agreement was 
welcomed as a major step towards peace and commended for two major achievements: (1) 
securing  the SPLM/A’s consent that Islamic Sharia law would remain the source of 
governance and legislation in the North, whereas the South would be governed by a secular 
administration; and (2) bringing the GoS to agree to an internationally observed 
referendum that would take place after a transition period of six-and-a-half years for the 
                                                          
8The IPF started as a new grouping of the friends of IGAD in 1994 and developed a strong partnership and 
was later renamed the IGAD Partners Forum in 1997 with three levels of partnership organs at ministerial, 
ambassadorial and technical level. The IPF is made up of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States 
of America, European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, United Nations 
Development Programme, and the World Bank. They work to enhance and to facilitate development 
processes in the IGAD region and provide a wide array of organisational, diplomatic and economic support 
for IGAD initiatives. Available at: http://igad.int/ -- About Us (pg 6 of 7). 
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South to decide whether to separate from Sudan or maintain its unity with Sudan (Iyob & 
Khadiagala, 2006: 121-122).   
 
The provisions of the Machakos Protocol provided the framework for subsequent 
comprehensive peace initiatives under the auspices of IGAD. These initiatives were 
supported by the active involvement and facilitation roles of the international community, 
represented by the USA, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy, and provisions were 
finalised that would cover the pre-interim, interim and post-interim period. 
 
Between 2003 and 2004 various negotiations took place in Naivasha, Kenya; the outcome 
was the signing of six additional protocols and agreements (Shinn, 2005: 139). Among 
these was the Agreement on Security Arrangement signed on September 25, 2003, which 
among other things stipulated that irrespective of whether the Southern Sudan seceded or 
not from Sudan, the Sudan and the South would maintain independent armies during the 
interim period; and that they would negotiate a ceasefire agreement mediated by IGAD and 
other international mediators (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 87). 
 
On January 7, 2004, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing was also endorsed, containing the 
guiding principles governing the equitable sharing of common wealth, mainly the division 
of oil and non-oil revenues, the management of the oil sector, the monetary authority and 
the reconstruction of the South and other war-affected areas. The agreement provided that 
2 percent of the oil revenue would be allocated to the oil producing states/regions in 
proportion to the output produced in such states/regions and the net oil revenue 
generated from South Sudan would be equally shared between the GoS and the 
Government of South Sudan (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 54). 
 
This was followed by the Protocol of Power Sharing of May 26, 2004 which defined the 
structure of the government of Sudan and provided that should the South vote for unity 
during the referendum, it would have its own regional government semi-autonomous from 
the broader Sudan (Jobbins, 2008: 6). Under this interim arrangement, the South would 
have an independent government at the regional level, while at the national level, an 
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interim Government of National Unity (GoNU), under the authority of the president, vice-
presidents and parliament would take charge of the matters of Sudan as a whole (LeRiche 
& Arnold, 2012: 109). Elections were to be held at all levels of government within four 
years of the interim period.  These provisions were very important as they underpinned 
the structure of the Sudanese governments in the long-term.   
 
The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei and the Protocol on the Resolution 
of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States were also signed on May 26, 2004. 
The Abyei agreement accorded Abyei special administrative status under the institution of 
the Presidency. It also approved the formation of an Abyei Referendum Commission that 
would oversee the referendum where Abyei would decide whether to remain part of the 
broader Sudan or South Sudan (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 65-69). The 
GoS and the SPLM/A further engaged in a democratic and consultative process aimed at 
resolving the conflicts in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States. This 
protocol allowed for these states to determine whether the comprehensive agreement 
satisfied the aspirations of the public as the final determining factor in ending the political 
conflict in that state (The Comprehensive Peace Agreement…2005: 73-83). 
 
The CPA signed between the GoS and the South rebel political movement SPLM/A on 
January 9, 2005, therefore comprised six protocols. Contingent on this agreement, a 
plebiscite was held in January 2011 where South Sudan overwhelmingly voted to secede 
from the RoS and was proclaimed an independent state on July 9, 2011. The CPA also 
provided for general national elections to be held during the interim period in accordance 
with the laws of the Interim National Constitution, which was adopted by the National 
Assembly in July 2005 (Almquist, 2010: 1).  
 
2.3.3. The CPA–Summary and Analysis 
The signing of the CPA paved the way for Sudan and South Sudan to move from a conflict to 
a post-conflict atmosphere. The negotiations and collection of agreements that led to the 
CPA indicate a shift beyond traditional round table negotiations as was the case with the 
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Addis Ababa Agreement to a more robust transformation mechanism of peace discussions 
at different levels based on internal consensus. The agreement thus represents 
considerable progress that gradually made a difference in the Sudan–South Sudan conflict 
situation by creating change in the conflict dynamics and the political situation. The 
international community was commended for its success in supplying different mediators 
to facilitate this peace process. As highlighted by Iyob and Khadiagala (2006: 125), 
President Al-Bashir pronounced that the agreement signalled an end to years of war and 
shaped a new covenant that obliged the Sudanese to share their wealth and safeguard their 
country.  
 
Even though the CPA created a transformative phase in the Sudan conflict, Sudan and South 
Sudan as post-conflict societies have remained fragile, and solid political, economic and 
social advancement in both states remains elusive. This presents a complexity of political 
and socio-economic challenges, especially in South Sudan, which faces serious threats to its 
security as well as to its effective and peaceful development processes. These impediments 
will be expounded on in chapter three. In part, they can be attributed to the loopholes in 
the CPA identified in the scholarly literature.  It is clear from the above discussion that the 
CPA mainly engaged two factions – the government’s NCP and SPLM/A.  
 
Considering the ethnic conflict embedded within the Sudanese and Southern communities 
amidst the broader Sudan-South conflict and the impact of the overall conflict on the 
masses, the following question arises: Where were/are the opinions of civil society 
organisations and the voices of other political and rebel parties9 which were identified in 
the CPA as the defining charter of the future of both states?  The details of the agreement 
failed to expansively address the humanitarian and political crisis in Darfur, which remains 
of great concern and a factor working against peace in Sudan. The CPA was also 
inconclusive on the issues of the geographical borders of the Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan 
and Abyei, which still constitute bones of contention and fuel the Sudans’ post-CPA conflict 
                                                          
9 For example, the Umma Party, the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), National Democratic Alliance, United 
Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National Islamic Front (NIF), 
were all party to the Sudan conflicts. 
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situations. Aside from the undefined borders, the CPA also seems to have excluded these 
areas from taking part in the referendum that would define South Sudan’s future at end of 
the interim period. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
Every historical era is defined by a common theme of major challenges. In Sudan, ethnic, 
economic, political and socio-cultural competition and inequalities between its Northern 
and Southern regions resulted in prolonged, decades-long civil wars. This chapter has 
analysed and reviewed these two civil wars and has concluded that the major dynamic that 
prolonged the conflicts was ethnic inequities, which spread to incorporate other forms of 
inequality.  A historical examination of the Sudan-South Sudan was undertaken to provide 
an understanding of the conflicts’ evolution patterns and the domino effect on the 
Sudanese population, as well as on the socio-economic and political environment and 
beyond. It was shown that the protracted conflicts between the Northern and Southern 
parts of Sudan did not materialise in a void. They originated in particular circumstances, 
prompted by certain historical, political, economic, social and cultural issues and dynamics. 
Generally, these included the exclusion of South Sudan from political power and 
development, the underdevelopment of the South, the problem of the overall exclusion of 
Southern Sudanese along ethnic lines, the ‘Islamisation’ and imposition of Sharia law over 
the whole country and the problems that generated from the discovery of mineral 
resources. 
 
During both civil wars numerous conflict resolution and ultimately conflict transformation 
initiatives were launched. While the Addis Ababa Agreement failed to resolve the conflict 
situation, the CPA was applauded for moving the conflict to a sustainable resolution; and 
IGAD’s role in this process proved instrumental. The achievement of the peace deal marked 
the official end of decades of protracted violent conflict between Northern and Southern 
Sudan regions and was a crucial moment in the country’s history. For South Sudan, this 
agreement allowed it to break free from years of marginalisation and oppression by the 
Khartoum government and from the destructive scourge of civil wars. The six-year interim 
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period affixed to the CPA provided the basis on which South Sudan was to decide on its 
future through a referendum.  
 
At the time, the biggest concerns were whether the parties would abide by the CPA’s 
provisions; what it would mean for both the North and South regions of Sudan, bearing in 
mind that the conflict had proliferated into Africa’s most protracted one; and whether the 
post-CPA period would witness a repetition of the outcome of the 1972 agreement or spark 
a major backlash in the country. As it turned out, Al-Bashir’s assertion that the CPA had 
created a path by which Sudan and its Southern regions would share their wealth while 
safeguarding the integrity of the country and the region was far from the reality of the 
transition period.  The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the CPA to involve or 
invite to the negotiating table other smaller insurgent groups active in the conflict; and to 
take into consideration the perspectives of the wider community at the base – who are the 
most affected by the consequences of the conflict, remain amongst the many challenges to 
the peace agreements. This creates a blurriness in the literature of conflict transformation 
and peace mechanisms on South Sudan (and Sudan) – a gap which this study intends to fill, 
contending that an all-inclusive approach of all the tiers in the conflict society is an 
imperative, if effective conflict transformation and peace-building are the long-term goals. 
 
The post-CPA political, economic and socio-cultural landscape (as will be established in the 
subsequent chapter) remained shaped by a multitude of complexities, especially land, 
border and resource issues, and most importantly ethnic-based clashes which have 
extended to, and continue to express themselves and impact negatively on South Sudan’s 
post-independence environment. It is against this backdrop that chapter three identifies 
and examines South Sudan’s post-conflict, post-independence challenges and their 
repercussions on peace-building and development efforts. Taking into account that the CPA 
also provided the platform for international actors to support Sudan’s transition to peace, 
the following chapter will further evaluate the role and engagement of stakeholders in 









3. South Sudan’s Post-Conflict and Post-Independence 
Environment: Exploring the Transformational and Peace-
Building Complexities 
3.1. Introduction 
The quest by the Southern region for peace and the transformation of their homeland into a 
modern nation-state, where citizens enjoy peace and security and are treated as equals, 
irrespective of their differences, has spanned decades, starting with the Torit mutiny in 
1955, and ending with the country's independence in July 2011.  South Sudan used various 
avenues to achieve its aspirations, as manifested in their willingness to sign the Addis 
Ababa Agreement in 1972, an experiment that turned out to be a disappointment for the 
Southern region.  In July 2011, South Sudan, while aware of the challenges facing a country 
emerging from a history mired in conflict, opted for independence in order to realise their 
desire for peace and transition into a society whose citizens live in peace and dignity. This 
chapter centres on an analysis of the challenges evident in the post-conflict transition 
period (January 2005 to 8 July 2011) that extended into post-independent South Sudan (9 
July 2011 to the present–December 2012), as well as the impact of Sudan's legacy of 
internal conflict and the spill over effects on South Sudan, as a prelude to charting future 
strategies for the independent South Sudan to achieve its goals. 
 
The months and years that followed the signing of the CPA were marked by significant 
transformation and peace-building complexities. These reflected the unresolved causes of 
the Sudan-South Sudan conflict and the problems left unaddressed by the CPA.  According 
to Wassara (2007: 5-7), South Sudan's internal challenges were/are compounded by 
Sudan. The challenges that confronted post-CPA South Sudan included the Darfur 
crisis.Additional factors include inter-communal tensions in South Sudan over land 
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ownership; social, political and economic inequalities; weak representative governments at 
the local level; and inequitable access to natural resources, especially between pastoralists 
and settled agriculturalists (Wassara, 2007: 5-7). Taken together, these factors presented a 
complex challenge to the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement with the possibility 
of widespread renewed violence.  
 
Another challenge was the death of John Garang10 in 2005, which weakened the position of 
SPLM and provoked the recurrence of inter-communal violence in Khartoum and parts of 
South Sudan (Young, 2005: 536). Other post-CPA transitional challenges included 
ideological disharmonies between the former foes, conflicts between the different 
fragmented rebel groups, especially within communities in South Sudan; the citizenship 
crisis; and undefined and unresolved border issues, which sparked occasional 
confrontations between the South Sudan-Sudan governments as they struggled to gain 
access to and control of the regions, especially oil-rich Abyei (Insight on Conflict, 2011). It 
is also worth noting that apart from these problems emanating from unresolved 
grievances, some of the immediate post-CPA challenges lay on Sudan and South Sudan’s 
non-adherence to certain provisions (like the oil and wealth sharing deal and the status of 
Abyei) of the peace treaty, as well as to the conventional impediments that accompany the 
implementation of peace agreements. 
 
Despite these challenges, the greater vision of the South Sudanese population, both at home 
and in the diaspora during this interim and transitional period of the CPA, remained 
focused on building a united force to realise the common goal of “Independence for South 
Sudan.” This unity was evident in the January 9, 2011 referendum where 99 percent of 
Southern Sudanese voted for secession and independence. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan 
became Africa‘s 54th independent state and the world’s newest and 195th sovereign nation-
                                                          
10 John Garang was the leader of SPLM/A and a key player in negotiating and signing the CPA. His death raised 
a lot of questions, including what the results of the referendum would have been under his leadership as the 
[first Vice President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and Leader and Chairman of the SPLM/A (Young, 
2005: 535)], especially considering his original position of unity. It is hard to predict what would have 
happened if Garang was still alive. There may well have been a different outcome, given his personality, 
political prominence, influence and network of alliances. 
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state. As it celebrated its first anniversary as a new Republic in July 2012, many recognised 
that South Sudan's official independence was a historic event for the African continent at 
large (El-Nour, 2011: 1). According to Herr (2011:1) independence created high 
expectations among the South Sudanese and the international community that one of 
Africa’s longest conflicts had finally come to an end. However, the persistence  of the 
challenges confronting the new state are indicative of the fact that the moment of 
opportunity which independence represented, has since been clouded by a myriad of 
complex developments, such as, the disputes with Sudan and internal ethnic divisions as 
well as state- and nation-building challenges.  
 
Independent South Sudan is confronted with the challenging task of building a new state 
out of nothing, which includes laying sound foundations for a broad-based accountable 
political, economic and social infrastructure and the institutions commensurate with a 
modern state. Kamier (2011: 12) and Jok (2011: 2) highlight the fact that South Sudan 
inherited weak state institutions, a corrupt civil service, non-existent or poor economic 
markets and physical infrastructure, an unstable political climate, financial crisis, violent 
ethnic divisions, a limited capacity for governance, an uncertain regional and international 
environment, and a decades' long legacy of insecurity left by the civil war (Lacher, 2012: 5).  
Moreover, in 2011, Southern Sudan’s Human Development Index remained among the 
lowest in the world, with the majority of its population living on less than one US dollar a 
day (Mears & Watt: 2011: 2). The wars stymied the development of South Sudan's human 
capital, which deeply damaged the possibility of a transparent public service and economic 
and social service institutions.  Other challenges originating from this background and 
currently engulfing South Sudan are the acute shortage of qualified employees, inequalities 
in income distribution, and limited access to health, education, and employment 
opportunities (Ali, 2011: 4). 
 
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Ad Hoc Advisory Group Report 
(2011: 7) has described South Sudan as representing the “single biggest state-building 
challenge of this generation”. While this reflects the magnitude of South Sudan’s 
predicament, it should be borne in mind that societies recovering from war are more often 
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than not characterised by similar challenges. The fragile situation in South Sudan is not 
uncommon, especially for a newly formed nation emerging and recovering from conflict.  
 
There have been numerous efforts to ensure the (re)construction and development of 
South Sudan as a new state and to establish long-term peace by addressing current 
problems. Both external and internal stakeholders11 have laid foundations to activate 
distressed local economies and expand social services (such as schools and health 
services), engaged in peacekeeping (to support the young state institutions), and supported 
the government in building a viable state infrastructure.  These projects aim to create 
accountable and stable political institutions, equitable economic development, human 
security, reinforcement of the rule of law and access to justice. Some stakeholders have 
established relationships with the South Sudan and the Sudan governments and have also 
been engaged in peace negotiations, humanitarian assistance, networking and raising 
public awareness among the various communities. Despite this multitude of endeavours, 
the international presence and the progress made in creating a peaceful and stable society, 
South Sudan’s transformation to peace and development remains challenged, prompting 
the pursuit of sustainable peace as a top national priority. 
 
It is pertinent to state that while the CPA – as was intended, made a difference in the 
Sudan-South Sudan conflict by creating the opportunity for political change, particularly for 
South Sudan, the challenges of the full and successful implementation of this agreement 
continue to manifest in post-independence South Sudan. This brings us to the first research 
question this chapter addresses: “What are the major challenges impinging on South 
Sudan’s transformation and peace-building capacity?” Addressing this question, the 
chapter examines South Sudan’s transformation difficulties – state-building and nation-
building challenges. And it is argued that South Sudan's transformation depends primarily 
on maintaining internal unity, peacefully resolving the outstanding CPA issues with Sudan, 
                                                          
11 IGAD, the UN, AU, and European Union (EU); Save the Children Project; Collaborative for Peace in Sudan 
(CFPS), Sudan Inter-Religious Council (SIRC), Sudanese Studies Centre (SSC), Sudan Common Humanitarian 
Fund (SCHF), the World Health Organisation (WHO); China, USA, Canada, Ethiopia, and Kenya are engaged in 
various projects and peace initiatives in the country (these are just a few of the many stakeholders/actors 
present in South Sudan). 
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creating a solid, diversified economic foundation, and nurturing partnerships with 
neighbours, friends and strategic allies. 
 
The map below portrays a picture of the Republic of South Sudan as of independence with 
its provinces and surrounding borders. 
 
Map 2: Map of the Republic of South Sudan as of July 9, 2011 
 
Source: Food Security Cluster, 2011.  http://foodsecuritycluster.net/countries/south-sudan-
republic. As indicated on the map, South Sudan is comprised of three provinces, which are 
subdivided into ten states. The Bahr el Ghazal Province consists of four states: Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes. The Greater Upper Nile Province comprises 
of three states: Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei. The Equatoria Province is also partitioned into three 





3.2. Post-Independence South Sudan: Conflict Transformation and 
Peace-building Objectives and Challenges 
Conflict transformation aims to change conflict attitudes, perceptions and relationships, be 
they political, economic or socio-cultural. Its short-term focus is ending violence and 
dealing with social justice and identity, livelihoods and political power-sharing to achieve 
long-term institutional and structural transformation (Austin et al., 2012: 25).  Conflict 
transformation’s objectives go beyond changing the conflict situation, and encompass 
state-building, nation-building and peace-building processes.  
 
As indicated in the first chapter, state-building consists of a collaborative process that 
supports the building of effective legitimate, accountable and responsive state institutions. 
It involves developing capacity and the legitimacy of the state by promoting a constructive 
relationship between the state and society, building inclusive political processes to 
facilitate a continuous exchange between state and society, and developing state capacity to 
perform its duties in such a way that it meets the expectations of the population (OECD – 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 2 & 22).  However, the 
process of state-building must be complemented by the nation-building process, where an 
equitable, democratic and egalitarian society is built and the will of the masses is 
represented in the conduct of the affairs of the state.  
 
According to Paul Kagame, President of Rwanda, the process of nation-building is a very 
challenging political development that includes four major components: “(1) The conscious 
cultivation of national identity as the foundation of social cohesion, the sense of belonging, 
based on shared values, tradition, history and aspiration. (2) The establishment of 
institutions and laws of governance which formalise the relationship between the leaders 
and the citizens, and their expectations of service delivery. (3) The participation of citizens 
in the governance process by choosing a system that best serves the people, selecting their 
leader and playing an active role in decision making; and (4) Establishing the climate and 
mechanisms for economic development for the whole nation” (Kagame, 2010: 2).  
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On the other hand, Dudouet (2006: 10-11) posits that peace-building is a process of change 
as well as an instrument of intervention in post-war societies, which aims to structurally 
transform the root causes of conflict in all areas – political, economic, and social. Lederach 
maintains that peace-building also entails building structures and processes that (re)define 
violent relationships into constructive and cooperative patterns and transforming the 
society during the implementation of peace processes (Dudouet, 2006: 11). According to 
Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 8) the process of peace-building comprises a wide 
range of measures, which include: strengthening national capacities to avert conflict, 
engaging security and development actions, humanitarian assistance, (re)building 
institutions of governance and the rule of law, and laying the foundations for sustainable 
peace and development (OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2010: 21). 
 
These state-building, nation-building and peace-building processes are crucial components 
for addressing any immediate post-conflict complexities and enhancing efforts for peace 
and development in fragile state situations. They are the key foundation for societal 
sustainability and stability. It is in the above context that the Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan, (2011(a): 41) defined its primary national development priorities as effective 
nation-building, state-building and peace-building. These priorities are adapted from the 
Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) framework, which spelled out South Sudan’s core 
transformation and peace-building goals (JAM Sudan, 2005: 40; OECD – Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 11-20; Government of the Republic of 
South Sudan, 2011(a)) These goals are:  
1. Reviving the economy to emerge from its distressed state and promoting economic 
growth as central to sharing peace dividends and to strengthening the emerging 
state institutions through developing physical and institutional infrastructure for 
better governance, prioritising agriculture, effectively managing the country’s 




2. Rebuilding internal South Sudanese peace and harmony, including through access to 
basic services, opportunities, wealth, and the wider political space; strengthening 
and enhancing cordial relationships with neighbouring countries; narrowing the gap 
between the citizens and state institutions; improving local security by reforming 
and making security institutions accessible; resolving disputes through negotiations 
with dissenters who resorted to force;  and strengthening the capacity of local 
government and traditional institutions. 
 
3. Investing in the development of human capital (health, education, training) 
including the successful return, resettlement and reintegration of refugees and the 
internally displaced.    
 
4. Embarking on a political process for broader inclusiveness and to end the conflict 
with a view to creating the basis for sustainable, sound governance and political 
stability, and constructive state-society relations as a critical facet of peace-building 
and state-building priorities (JAM Sudan, 2005: 40; OECD – Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010: 11-20; Government of the Republic 
of South Sudan, 2011(a)). 
 
The South Sudan Development Plan for 2011–2013 restates these priorities in its long-
term goals up to 2040, which are based on the vision of “a nation that is educated and 
informed; prosperous, productive and innovative, compassionate and tolerant; free, just 
and peaceful; democratic and accountable; safe, secure and healthy; and united and proud.”  
In the short- and mid-term, the objectives are to ensure that South Sudan should be “fully 
established as a peaceful, stable, viable and secure and united nation, building strong 
foundations for effective governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for 
all citizens” by 2014 (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 41). 
 
However, a host of inherited and post-independence challenges and difficulties hinder 
South Sudan in achieving these noble objectives. Chimanikire (2011) notes that these 
include: the urgency of meeting the needs of its impatient population; healing the wounds 
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of post-conflict border struggles which persist over resources in Abyei and South Kordofan; 
avoiding massive reliance on Direct Foreign Investment (DFI) for building state institutions 
and infrastructure; managing resources and the South’s unavoidable relationship with the 
Republic of Sudan; developing strategies to prevent and contain cross-border and internal 
South-South conflicts; and managing active internal security threats from armed groups 
(El-Nour, 2011). Similarly, Van der Zwan (2011: 9) asserts that besides the problem of 
citizenship; sharing oil revenue; border demarcation; and sharing the debt burden that 
confronts South Sudan, the country is also embroiled in one of the most difficult tasks of 
state-building and rehabilitation since the end of the Cold War.  
 
Conflict prevention and improved security are major preoccupations for a newly emerging 
country with a recent history of conflict. South Sudan experienced two conflicts (chapter 
two): the first had its origins in the marginalisation, discrimination and underdevelopment 
of Southern Sudan, whereas the latter was sparked by poor economic development and 
governance, and the Sudan government's policies that violated the 1972 Addis Ababa 
accord, which provided for the unique identity of South Sudan to be respected. Thus, the 
government of South Sudan has prioritised four major challenges: human and social 
development; economic development; governance; and conflict prevention and security 
(Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 44). While these challenges are 
diverse yet interrelated, each plays its part in complicating the political, socio-economic 
and security transformation and development of South Sudan into a stable and peaceful 
sovereign state.  
 
Politically, the absence of efficient and transparent public administration; financial 
management, the decentralisation of political leadership and improved representation and 
empowerment have been among the major concerns. Such challenges have been cited as 
the reasons for widespread perceptions that government and state portfolios are 
predominantly concerned with the SPLM members and its military wing, the SPLA, who 
hail mostly from the Dinka ethnicity (Haile, 2012). According to the report of a focus group 
interview conducted by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, this 
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centralisation and monopoly of power speaks to the problem of power imbalances and 
domination (Cook, 2011: 7). Many have also identified these factors as the cause of 
corruption, discrimination, tribalism and tribal conflict, unfair government employment 
practices, and the marginalisation and exclusion of other ethnic groups from state politics 
and the denial of their right to share the gains of the long war for independence (Cook, 
2011: 7 & 9). As such, the challenge is for the SPLM/A to substantially reform itself and 
accommodate other political parties and the broader society.  
 
The culture of accountability and transparency remains very weak.  LeRiche and Arnold 
(2012: 142) argue that another challenge to political development is the fact that 
administrative decisions are mainly taken in the upper echelons of government, that is, 
decision-making is concentrated in the president’s office to the exclusion of other key 
ministerial offices. This sets a bad precedent for the entire state apparatus (national, state, 
and county levels), and deprives governments at all levels from benefitting from the rich 
contributions that wider citizen participation can offer government policy-making.  It can 
also alienate key stakeholders, including public servants, who may feel marginalised.  The 
most serious challenge, however, is the state's alienation from its constituents, which may 
jeopardise the political future of the ruling party – SPLM, and trigger new sources of 
instability.   
 
The impact of South Sudan’s strategic relationship with Sudan likewise presents a political 
challenge to peace and development efforts, and by extension, also constitutes a security 
and economic problem. This relationship is mainly defined by the issues of contested 
border territories and oil and natural resources, which stoked the conflict between South 
Sudan and Sudan for decades. South Sudan is experiencing a low but a rising concentration 
of cross-border conflicts and violence (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 158). Since independence, 
aerial bombings combined with cross border attacks have been rampant in the disputed 
areas of the Blue Nile and Abyei, among others. Recent developments indicate that there 
are approximately nine insurgent groups operating, mainly along the Sudan-South Sudan 




According to Human Rights Watch (2012: 2), 2011 witnessed a steady increase in conflict 
between the South Sudan ruling party, SPLM and Sudan’s ruling party NCP, over oil 
revenue sharing, border management and the status of the contested area of Abyei. The 
statistics relating to these conflicts speak for themselves: (1) almost 110,000 people were 
displaced to Warrap state in South Sudan following the violent occupation of Abyei by 
Sudan just before independence; (2) the outbreak of conflict between the Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF) and other fractions of SPLA in Southern Kordofan resulted in the 
displacement of more than 20,000 people to South Sudan’s Unity state; and (3) in 
September 2011, an estimated 4,000 people were displaced to the Upper Nile state in South 
Sudan as a result of the outbreak of violent hostilities between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) 
and the SPLM-North12 in Southern Kordofan (Human Rights Watch, 2012: 2). In 2012, there 
were a series of bombings in the capital of the oil-producing Unity border state by the SAF, 
and conflict erupted between Sudan and South Sudan over control of Heglig in the Abyei 
region and the oil facility within it (Sudan Tribune, 2012(a)).  These border area conflicts 
have a significant bearing on South Sudan's political environment in that they are diverting 
attention and scarce resources from internal development efforts.  
 
These disputed areas between Sudan and South Sudan, as indicated in the map below 
include: Abyei region, which is located along the borders of South Sudan and Sudan; the oil 
rich Hehlig town, which since independence in 1956 to 2003 was administered as part of 
Unity State in the Southern Sudan, but is positioned in the Northern Sudan side of the map 
since 1956; the Kafia Kingi region, which is the largest of the regions disputed between 
Sudan and South Sudan, but an area belonging to the North’s South Darfur since 1960; and 
the Jau area, located on the border of Unity State and South Kordofan (Political Geography 
Now, 2012). Other areas under dispute also include: the Bahr el Arab (Kiir) River, which is 
translated the ‘River of the Arabs’ by the north, and the Kiir River by the South; the Kaka 
town located within the Upper Nile state, but had since 1956 been occupied by northern 
farmers; the Megenis Mountains – divided between Sudan's White Nile, South Kordofan 
states and South Sudan's Upper Nile state; and the Jodha area, located between Renk 
                                                          




County in the South’s Upper Nile state and Jebeleyn County in the North’s White Nile state 
(Political Geography Now, 2012).  
 
Map 3: Border map of Sudan and South Sudan Showing disputed and conflict areas in 2012 
 
Source: Political Geography Now, 2012. http://www.polgeonow.com/2012/05/feature-sudan-
south-sudan-border_26.html . The map shows the disputed areas and the eruption of clashes from 
the beginning of 2012, between South Sudan and Sudan. It also speaks to the level of security 
threats facing both states, particularly the new state of South Sudan as it struggles to build a 
sustainably peaceful and stable society. 
 
Socio-economically, widespread poverty and food insecurity; a high illiteracy rate and 
unemployment; poor access to health; the government’s high dependence on oil revenues 
and the country’s limited capacity to effectively manage large inflows of aid and private 
investment; underdevelopment of the financial sector and weak or non-existent monetary 
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policies; and limited domestic production, resulting in dependence on imports, characterise 
the collective challenges of social and economic development in South Sudan. According to 
Dagne (2011: 14), South Sudan’s economy greatly depends on oil revenue, which accounts 
for an estimated 98 percent of its public revenue and contributes significantly to the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Kimenyi, 2012: 8). USAID (2012) estimated in 
2012 that 890,000 people in South Sudan are extremely food insecure and 2.4 million are 
moderately food insecure; while approximately 80 percent of the South Sudanese 
population live in rural areas and are largely dependent on livestock and subsistence 
farming; this important sector receives less than two percent of the national budget (Mears 
and Watt, 2011: 4), indicating the rural-urban divide and imbalances. South Sudan’s 
development indicators reveal that (Dagne, 2011: 15; The UN in South Sudan, 2011: 3): 
 
 The total population of South Sudan is 8.2 million. 
 
 An estimated 72% of the population is below the age of 30. 
 
 An estimated 27% of the adult population is literate and 92% of women cannot read 
or write. 
 
 More than 51% of the population live below the poverty line; with more than 90% 
estimated to be income poor; only 1% of households have a bank account. 
 
 85% of the population lacks access to basic health centres. 
 
 An estimated 83% of the population live in rural areas. 
 
 Less than 10% of children complete primary school. 
 
 An estimated 78% of households depend on crop farming or animal husbandry and 




 Infant mortality is 102 per 1,000 live births. The mortality rate of children below 
five years is 135/1000 (Dagne, 2011: 15; The UN in South Sudan, 2011: 3). 
 
The marked variations in the quality of social and economic life is best reflected in the 
situation of the rural/urban divide, where 51 percent are poor, of which 55 percent of the 
poor are rural and 24 percent are urban (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 
2011(a): XIII). The challenges facing rural areas can be partly attributed to the fact that the 
government inherited a weak infrastructure, which affected its ability to manage the 
resources it has in the most optimal manner. The influx of thousands of returnees, 
especially from Sudan, adds to the demand for basic social and economic services (Mears & 
Watt, 2011: 2). Furthermore, Mears and Watt note that literacy and education are major 
challenges, given that only 40% of men and 16% of women are literate; while literacy in 
practical reading and writing skills is likely to be much lower. While there is a high 
unemployment rate, there are not enough qualified personnel to fill the few available 
employment opportunities. The UN Security Sector Reform Unit (2012: 42) also notes that 
out of the more than 150,000 South Sudan armed forces, 75 percent are illiterate. This 
hampers efforts aimed at transforming the security sector into an efficient operational and 
accountable system. Literacy is an empowerment tool in every society that seeks peace, 
security and development, and political, economic and social prosperity. 
 
South Sudan’s abundant natural resources and the country's high dependence on oil 
further complicate the complex economic and political situation in the country. Should 
South Sudan fail to apply the lessons learned from the undesirable experiences of resource-
rich post-conflict nations like the DRC, the country will encounter internal and external 
threats.   On the domestic level, South Sudan might experience what has come to be known 
as the ‘resource curse’ if it:  (1) adopts frugal policies to control expenditure and embark on 
aggressive savings to invest in national development; (2) makes inefficient investments 
that lead to inefficient redistribution and its attendant challenges; (3) if the economic 
strength of the country (agriculture, agribusiness, agro-industry) is not embraced as the 
central focus of economic development; and (4) if the inherited and weak state institutions 
are not strengthened to develop and consolidate checks and balances and result in a 
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situation where public resources are redistributed to existing and potential political 
constituencies (Collier and Goderis, 2007: 21 & 26).  These internal threats are 
accompanied by external challenges not only because of the conflict over resources, but 
more so because, although South Sudan controls oil production, the oil refineries, pipelines 
and transportation are still on Sudanese territory; and part of the transportation is 
managed by the Sudan.  
 
In January 2012, South Sudan discontinued use of Sudan's pipelines and port facilities in 
protest against high transit fees imposed by the Sudan, and shut down all its oil production 
(Kimenyi, 2012: 8).  As Kimenyi notes, this led to a loss of revenue that forced the 
government of South Sudan to adopt a 3.45 billion South Sudanese Pound (SSP) austerity 
budget. This will cause a substantial reduction in government expenditure; most 
disturbingly, it will lead to cuts in critical areas such as agriculture, local government 
development, education and health (Kimenyi, 2012: 8). According to USAID (2012), the 
trade blockade with Sudan, combined with other factors, such as the very low 2011 
harvests, inter-tribal conflicts, and a growing population of refugees, IDPs and returnees, 
are significant contributors to increasing food insecurity. Another challenge created by the 
shut-down of oil production is that it has the potential to further expose South Sudan to 
unpredictable economic and by extension, social risks; security is likely to deteriorate with 
the two countries continuing their proxy war against each other. 
 
Security remains important to development, and addressing and resolving internal 
conflicts and disagreements and stabilising peace are central to achieving the desired 
security objectives.13 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
reports that South Sudan faces major political and socio-economic challenges, which 
continue to be exacerbated by inter-communal animosity, insurgency by rebel groups and 
localised conflicts over land and natural resources, further aggravated by the mass arrival 
of South Sudanese refugees from Sudan and other parts of Africa (UNHCR, 2012). South 
Sudan has more than 60 ethnic groups scattered throughout the geographic regions of the 
                                                          




country. Internal ethnic divisions and conflicts among these groups remain an enormous 
challenge to sustainable peace and stability. The patterns of ethnic diversity and conflict 
within the South Sudan communities started developing during the years of the civil wars 
and have grown to embrace social, political, and economic grievances. This has led to 
entrenched insecurity, which is manifested in ongoing ethnic conflicts within and between 
the various South Sudanese communities over resources, power-sharing, land and violent 
cattle raids.  
 
The resource and power sharing conflict is mostly fought between the Dinka and the Nuer 
ethnic groups, who contest Dinka domination of public and political office. Haile (2012) 
highlights that the exclusion of the majority has fuelled the formation of rebel groups – the 
South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA), South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army (SSDM/A) 
and the National United Front (NUF), among others. These groups have been behind the 
numerous attacks in regions such as Unity state, which produces a third of South Sudan’s 
total oil production (Haile, 2012). As further indicated by Haile, these rebel groups are also 
working to overthrow President Salva Kiir’s government, as evident in this statement 
released on November 17, 2011 –“It is our position that once Salva Kiir is removed, our 
government will give each household across the ten states of South Sudan a share of oil 
money. We will ensure that the oil money is accessible to each and every citizen of South 
Sudan. Under Salva Kiir regime, the oil money is controlled by Awan clan where he originated 
from. As soon as the current regime is toppled, each Southern Sudanese will get monthly 
payment from the government as the way to redistribute oil money” (SouthSudan.Net, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, ethnic conflicts revolving around the issues of cattle raids and land between 
the Murle and Nuer ethnic groups are also a major cause of instability in the Jonglei State 
and in South Sudan as a whole. The outbreak of conflict in August and September 2011 
resulted in deaths of 600 Nuer inhabitants, the kidnapping of children and the raid and 
slaughter of tens of thousands of cattle (Agbor & Taiwo, 2012: 14). The Nuer-Murle ethnic 
conflict has continued to spread and intensify, causing increased displacement and the 
deaths of thousands of people. These ethnic tensions have led to the increased use and 
possession of small firearms, especially by the youth who feel they are not afforded 
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equitable opportunities to access the normal services provided by the government, such as 
security and the rule of law; they feel a communal obligation to protect their ethnic identity 
and property (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 6). As a result, youths 
in South Sudan have tended to direct their loyalty towards protecting their ethnicity than 
their identity as one nation.  
 
This situation represents a high risk with potential for outbreak of widespread violent 
conflict.  The majority of the country’s population are youth (51 percent) under the age of 
eighteen, with 72 percent under the age of 30 (Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 
2011(a): 13). Moreover, this generation of youth grew up experiencing the cruelty and 
violent conflicts and have not known peace. If this social force is not dealt with correctly, 
this will have serious security implications for the future development of the state.  
 
Internal conflicts and their repercussions have exacerbated the already difficult 
humanitarian situation in South Sudan. There is common consensus that conflicts over 
identity and resources have been the backdrop for protracted violent conflict in Africa; 
examples include Burundi, the DRC, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Sudan. Similarly, the case of 
South Sudan (though not yet extensive) is also posing serious challenges to the efforts and 
ideals of sustainable peace, development and stability in the country at large. 
 
3.3. Addressing Post-Independence Challenges and Building on the 
Nation’s Development Objectives 
South Sudan’s growing challenges (as outlined above) have raised the question as to 
whether it will be able to forget the spoils of war and develop into an all-inclusive 
sovereign state out of the shadows of the RoS; and whether it will be able to sustainably 
achieve peace and stability by overcoming ongoing and future challenges (Haile, 2012). 
While these questions remain to be answered, these challenges to South Sudan’s effective 
development require remedial, short-and medium-term and long-term measures for the 
realisation of the country’s transformation and peace-building priorities. Kameir (2011: 
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12) suggests that in managing South Sudan’s challenges three important areas, internal 
security, including the identification of salient as well as latent causes for instability; 
guaranteeing peace dividends to the people of South Sudan; and good governance and 
integrity in public life, which is the key to political stability and healthy economic growth, 
need urgent attention. 
 
According to Coutts and Ong (2001), managing post-conflict challenges generally requires 
the broader coordination of security at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. This 
involves a number of factors: engaging local stakeholders (as the sustainability of any 
solution depends on its acceptance by the local community); strengthening indigenous 
police forces; and harmonising civil and military operations (Coutts and Ong, 2001). For 
Finell (2002), such management efforts should include: policing; strengthening the rule of 
law; strengthening civilian administration; and civilian protection as the priority target 
areas for crisis management. John Paul Lederach (1997) and Timothy Donais (2012) also 
underscore the importance of empowering local ownership of post-conflict peace-building 
processes as a vital strategy for managing post-conflict complexities, and supporting the 
transformation of the relationship between the conflicting or former conflict parties from 
one of confrontation, to one of conciliation and development. 
 
The Government of South Sudan has been engaged in discourses and broad-based 
policy decisions to address its numerous complexities by way of building on its outlined 
peace and development goals. With support from the international community, the 
government has taken steps to institutionalise good and democratic governance; promote 
peace-building activities and respect for human rights; execute major state duties such as 
security and justice, service delivery and mobilizing revenue; generate employment 
opportunities; and facilitate infrastructural and economic development (Kameir, 2011: 8). 
The government has also been working to realise key state-building processes, which 
comprise: a political reconciliation process that aims to build a national identity; security 
reforms to deal with the monopoly of force; engaging in clear and strategic communication 
on matters surrounding the transitional constitution; and engendering a major 
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development plan through collaborative ministerial efforts (LeRiche & Arnold, 2012: 143). 
In April 2012, for instance, the Presidential Committee for Peace, Reconciliation and 
Tolerance in Jonglei held a workshop for dialogue and in May, the Presidential Committee 
and traditional chiefs in Jonglei state signed a peace deal in a ceremony witnessed by 
President Kiir. This peace agreement recommended the implementation of development 
projects, such as road construction and the opening of police stations within the 
communities (International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 2012: 13). 
 
To achieve the country’s stated transformation and peace-building goals, the GoSS, with the 
assistance of the UN framed the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) for 2011-2013, 
which identified four priority areas. These are: Human and social development, the aim 
being the expansion and strengthening of government provision of basic services and the 
establishment of social safeguards for the poorest and most vulnerable; Economic 
development, which will focus on large-scale infrastructure development, especially the 
expansion of the road network and the provision of energy, and the establishment of 
community-based infrastructure and development projects; Governance, to focus on 
projects that support capacity-building and core governance functions; and Conflict 
prevention and security relating to the transformation of the security sector and 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes as well as the 
establishment of a legal framework for all levels of government (Government of the 
Republic of South Sudan, 2011(a): 140-141).  
 
As a young nation, South Sudan's democratic future depends on its ability to promote a 
political culture where government is held accountable by the legislature, and the 
independence of the judiciary is upheld. It is for this reason that the 2011-2013 SSDP 
devotes significant attention to governance.  Similarly, economic development creates a 
concrete foundation for citizens to live a quality, dignified life and paves the way for a 
sustainable democratic system. The SSDP thus also assigns high priority to economic 
development. The plan also focuses on social services (education, health, social support) as 
a sector through which the state communicates with its citizens. Conflict is detrimental to 
South Sudan’s state- and nation-building endeavours, and as such conflict prevention and 
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resolution are important components of the plan. Table 1 below presents the government’s 
plan for the priority areas and targeted outcomes by the end of 2013. 
 
Table 1: Priority Programme Outcome Objectives and 2013 Targets 
Outcome Objective                    Indicator 2013 Target 
Governance 
Improved whole-of-government 
approach to addressing national 
presidential priorities by GoSS and 
state institutions. 
Number of GoSS institutions that can 
correctly articulate key national priorities 
Increase by 50% 
from baseline 
Number of GoSS institutions that 
implement key national priorities 
Increase by 40% 
from baseline. 
Enhanced coordination, application 
and development of   knowledge and 
skills of public servants. 
Proportion of GoSS institutions that 
conduct training and that report on the 
effectiveness of training to the Ministry of 




Increase the capacity of SSLA to 
effectively and efficiently carry its 
oversight function through review of 
the laws passed and increase the 
numbers of laws passed annually. 
Number of bills submitted to SSLA, 
debated, and enacted into law. 
Baseline: 12 laws passed in 2010 
18 
Collect, analyse and disseminate all 
official geospatial, economic, social,  
demographic, census, environmental 
and food security statistics, ensuring 
that the Government and DPs  have 
access to up-to-date and accurate 
information with which to plan the 
efficient and equitable allocation of 
public resources. 
SSCCSE’s score on the Statistical Capacity 
Building Indicator (SCBI). 
Baseline: No score on SCBI 
Improve five 
percentage 
points on 2011 
baseline. 
Improved stability of government 
revenue and management of the 
macro-economy 
Amount of non-oil revenues collected. 
Baseline: SDG 118 million, 2009. 
SDG500 million. 
Monthly revenue forecasts established 






To increase crop production and 
land/ vegetation cover. 
Sustained increase in cereal crop 
production, and overall production 
increase of other major food crops. 
(Baseline 2010:  estimated traditional 
sector cereal  production was 0.695 
million Mt  - last five years average was 




above 1.0 million 
Mt per year. 
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Improved interstate, trunk and 
feeder roads routinely maintained 
on sustainable basis and roads 
safety to enhance economic growth. 
Length of asphalted trunk road network 
under construction/completed. Baseline: 
0km 
752km 
Length of constructed engineered roads 
Baseline: 363km of interstate and feeder 
roads constructed to engineered roads 
standard in 2010 
2000km 
Length of roads under maintenance with 
safety provision. 
Baseline: 1750km of roads is under  
maintenance and safety provision 
4500km 
To promote and improve the 
exploration, development, 
production and utilisation of South 
Sudan’s mineral, oil and other 
energy resources. 
Award new licenses and attract new 
mineral and oil exploration companies. 




Increase oil recovery and a number of oil 
infrastructures in South Sudan.  
Baseline 2010: 0. 
3 
To increase production of livestock 
and fish commodities. 
Gradual and sustained increase of 
production and market supply of meat 
and milk. (Baseline: MARF Strategic Plan 
2006-10 and 2010 MDTF project 
assessment report). 
157 Mt of meat. 
5,250 litres of 
milk. 
Sustained increase of  production and 
market supply of fish (baseline 2010: 
estimated by GTZ/FAO survey report 
fresh fish production/catch was 40,000 
Mt) 
100,000Mt 
Sustainable management of water 
resources to enhance access to safe 
water and improved sanitation 
services; and other uses. 
Percentage of rural communities with 
access to safe water. 
Baseline: 34% in 2010 
40% 
Social and Human Development 
Reduce maternal, infant and child 
mortality. 
Percent of population with access to 
healthcare. Baseline: 13%. 
40% 
Provide qualified teachers, academic 
staff and a relevant curriculum for 
general education. 
Teacher: pupil ratio. 






Qualified secondary 1:24. Qualified 
secondary 1:16. 
By 2013 South Sudan is on track to 
achieve universal access and 
completion of free primary 
education and has expanded 
equitable access to post-primary 
education. 
Gross Enrolment Rate 
Baseline: Total: 78%; Boys: 88%; Girls: 
61%. 
92% 
Net Enrolment Rate (NET). 





Gradually provide families with 
unconditional child benefit cash 
transfers nation-wide 
Percent of households receiving cash 
transfer through child benefit. 
20% 
Conflict Prevention and Security 
5. Establishment of effective and 
affordable  DDR programme to 
support transformation strategies 
for all organised forces (SPLA, SSPS, 
prisons, fire brigade and wildlife 
forces)  and to provide ex-
combatants and host communities 
with a sustainable future, including 
the reintegration of women and 
children. 
Number of organised force personnel 
disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated                      
(Baseline: 11,130 special needs group 
from SPLA disarmed and demobilised  as 
at 25 February 2011, of which  10,760 
were counselled and 8,523 were at 
various stages of reintegration. Service 
delivery timelines for DDR have varied 
widely, and have not provided ex-




1. Improved, coordinated security-
related policy- and decision-making 
at national, state and county level, 
based on appropriate information-
gathering and analysis. 
Appropriate National Security 
Architecture established. (Baseline: No 
national security committee secretariat. 
No national security advisor, although 







1. South Sudan has essential legal 
framework befitting an independent 
country.     
Number of MoLACD draft legal 
documents submitted to the Council of 
Ministers (CoM). (37 laws in force, 
transitional constitution drafting 
underway). 
60 
2. Access to justice and respect for 
human rights across South Sudan 
enhanced. 
Number of functional legal affairs offices 
at the county level. (32 county legal 
affairs offices established). 
75 
Communities secure and threat 
posed by small arms reduced. 
Implement community security approach 
in all ten states (conflict-sensitive 
development projects implemented in 
25% of counties) 
50% of counties 
across all ten 
states 
 
Source: Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011. South Sudan Development Plan 2011-
2013: Realising freedom, equality, justice, peace and prosperity for all (pp. 44 – 46). 
 
The African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) mandated by the 
African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) has been facilitating negotiations 
between South Sudan and Sudan to address border and resource disputes. The negotiations 
have so far been chaired by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and former 
member of the International Court of Justice, Judge Abdul Koroma. These negotiations have 
been guided by the principle of promoting a relationship where both countries will remain 
politically, socially, economically and culturally interlinked, stable, democratic, fair and 
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prosperous (Kameir, 2011: 9). In November 2011, the AUHIP defined an administrative 
common borderline roadmap for both countries, in terms of which all disputed areas lay 
north of the north-south border.  In April 2012, negotiations and security dialogue 
concerning resources and border disputes between South Sudan and Sudan in Addis Ababa 
became the main forum for the international community to instigate a ceasefire (Hsiao, 
2012: 3). While the roadmap negotiations of 2011 remained disputed, from May to August 
2012, the AUHIP succeeded in bringing the two governments together in negotiations 
focusing on the implementation of the provisions of the previous negotiations and 
statements of the roadmap, and on August 3, 2012, the parties reached an innovative 
agreement on the terms of payment under which South Sudan would resume the export of 
oil through Port Sudan (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012: 1).  These 
negotiations, supported by Ethiopia, in its capacity as Chair of IGAD, resulted in the signing 
of a series of agreements by the presidents of South Sudan and Sudan on September 27, 
2012. The agreements covered security arrangements, oil and transitional financial 
arrangements, the status of nationals of one country resident in the other, post‐service 
benefits, trade, banking, border issues and other economic concerns, as well as an overall 
Cooperation Agreement (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2012: 1).  
 
In the main, the AU has endeavored to integrate the substantive contributions of South 
Sudan and Sudan in its mediation efforts to resolve the outstanding CPA issues of resources 
and border delineations.  It is worth mentioning that a local delegation from Sudan was in 
Addis Ababa before the signing of the September 27, 2012 agreements. Solutions arrived at 
with the broadest participation of the grassroots often create a sense of ownership and 
sustain the process and solutions. Importantly, the September 27 agreement, irrespective 
of the stalemate on the contested Abyei region, provided for the implementation process to 
start within a month of the signing, and for oil production to resume at the end of 2012 
(Sudan Tribune, 2012(b)). However, the major challenge regarding this new development is 





In furthering regional efforts for peace and development in South Sudan, IGAD also 
complements other interventions supported by United States, South Africa (Public 
Administration Leadership and Management Academy), and the Government of Kenya 
Technical Cooperation, among others (IGAD, 2011: 5). It further supports several public 
sector reform initiatives, such as the Capacity Building Institutional and Human Resource 
Development Project implemented by the World Bank and funded by the South Sudanese 
Government and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and initiatives of the Capacity Building Trust 
Fund (IGAD, 2011: 5). In terms of capacity building, IGAD has deployed workers and plans 
to deploy about 200 more experienced civil servants from three of its member states 
(Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) to assume duties in respective ministries in South Sudan 
with the aim of providing direct on-the-job training to South Sudanese civil servants 
(Kameir, 2011: 29). 
 
The United Nations has also been an influential player in enhancing peace and security in 
South Sudan. On July 8, 2011, UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1996 (2011) 
established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and deployed a large 
peacekeeping operation team with 7,000 military personnel, 900 civilian police recruits 
and a significant civilian component (Sabra, 2011: 4). The UNSC (2011: 3) mandated the 
UNMISS to enhance peace and security, assist in the establishment of peace and stability as 
a necessary condition for development in the Republic of South Sudan and as a step 
towards reinforcing the capacity of the GoSS to govern effectively and democratically, and 
establish good relations with its neighbours. The mandate also tasked the UNMISS to: (1) 
support peace consolidation and promote viable state-building and economic development; 
(2) support the government in taking up its responsibilities for conflict prevention, 
mitigation, resolution and the protection of civilians; and (3) further encourage the 
government to work in cooperation with the UN Country Team and other international 
stakeholders in the development of its capacity to provide security, establish the rule of 
law, and strengthen the security and justice sectors in accordance with the principles of 




Thus far, the main priority areas in the UNMISS broad peace-building plan have been to 
transform South Sudan’s security policies and institutions; convert the SPLA into a national 
army and extend the state’s presence and legitimacy throughout the territory (Sabra, 2011: 
4). Given this, UNMISS has been working in close collaboration with the GoSS and local 
communities to develop a National Security Strategy. They have been involved in the 
evaluation of the capabilities and gaps of the security sector; reinforcing security 
committees in the ten South Sudan states and their link to the central level; and fostering 
the capacity of state and non-state actors to manage the activities of security institutions 
and sustain the control of small arms and light weapons (UN Security Sector Reform Unit, 
2012: 42). With these efforts in place, the UNMISS has been able to build solid relationships 
with the GoSS at the strategic political level, and has assisted the government in providing 
45,800 rules of engagements cards for the South Sudan Armed Forces (UN Security Sector 
Reform Unit, 2012: 42). 
 
Furthermore, UN Agencies14 have also been working towards meeting and achieving eight 
Millennium Development Goals15 for 2015 in South Sudan. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) efforts in particular have focused on training 
professionals in the public service, strengthening the management of public resources, and 
improving the rule of law and the security of communities as the groundwork of a 
functioning state (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011). Since independence, the UN has deployed 
more than 100 UN volunteer experts and 200 civil servants to various sectors of South 
Sudan’s government and public offices to support essential functions in planning and 
budgeting, public finance management and other sectors necessary for establishing and 
                                                          
14United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);  United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); 
International Labour Organization (ILO); United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM); and 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  in collaboration with  International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) and World Health Organisation (WHO) (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011). 
15Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and 
empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/Aids, malaria and other 
diseases, ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development (UNDP in 
South Sudan, 2011). 
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running a state, as well as providing direct and on-the-job monitoring of civil service 
workers (UNDP in South Sudan, 2011; Grande, 2012). 
 
Kenya is an instrumental and strategic player in South Sudan’s peace-building efforts. 
Responding to the problem of skills shortages, especially in the civil service in South Sudan, 
Kenya deployed 50 civil servants to work in strategic functions within South Sudan’s 
national ministries, commissions and state-level local government, and in frontline service 
delivery in areas experiencing chronic shortages, such as health (IGAD, 2011: 5). Kenya is 
also an important trading partner of South Sudan, as South Sudan imports and exports its 
goods through the port of Mombasa in Kenya. Kenya and South Sudan are also partners in a 
major regional infrastructural investment – the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan-
Ethiopia Transport Corridor (Howes, 2012). This project involves building airports, 
railways and roads, and most importantly, the January 2012 agreement between Kenya 
and South Sudan to construct a new oil pipeline from South Sudan’s oil fields to Lamu, 
Kenya (Howes, 2012).  
 
Local Institutions and NGOs’ Efforts: The South Sudan Institute (SSI),16 together with 
CARE South Sudan have also been working to resolve tribal-based conflicts in the Jonglei 
State, which is made up of five tribes – Dinka, Nuer, Murle, Anyuak, and Jie (South Sudan 
Institute, 2012: 6). The SSI and CARE, through the Jonglei Peace of Neighbours project, have 
been engaged in efforts to develop skills and encourage the peaceful resolution of ethnic 
conflicts. The primary objective of this project, which was carried out by citizens of Jonglei 
State called the Ambassador Group (AG), is for the tribes to live peacefully and respectfully 
with one another (South Sudan Institute, 2012: 6). 
 
                                                          
16SSI was established in 2008 as an NGO to response to the need for peace, food security, and education in 
Jonglei State. Its main mission included the provision of services in the areas of education, agriculture, and 
peace-building. For the implementation of the peace-building element, SSI, with financial support from CARE 
South Sudan, recruited 22 citizens of Jonglei State living in North America to form the Ambassador Group 
(South Sudan Institute, 2012: 6). 
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Local NGOs like the Collaborative for Peace in Sudan (CfPS)17 have been working to bring 
together organisations from Sudan and South Sudan to coordinate their efforts to assist 
border ethnic groups and communities to overcome their differences and settle their 
disputes peacefully (Peace Direct, 2012). While little has been reported on the efforts of 
faith-based organisations, local NGOs and civil society in the transformation processes in 
South Sudan, the Joint Donor Team (JDT)18  has supported the inclusion of local civil society 
organisations in peace-building processes in partnership with state actors (Joint Donor 
Team, 2012: 1). 
 
Other NGOs and UN agencies have been providing about 80 percent of basic services in 
South Sudan. The African Development Bank for example undertook an "Infrastructure 
Needs Assessment Study" to address the critical infrastructure sectors of transport, energy 
and water and sanitation (Kameir, 2011: 26 &27).  ‘Save the Children’ which is one of the 
largest international NGOs in South Sudan has launched several development programmes 
in nine of the country’s ten states, including all its border states. These include nutrition, 
community and facility-based healthcare, water and sanitation, livelihoods and food 
security, education, child protection, children’s rights, and emergency response 
programmes (Mears & Watts, 2011: 2). Likewise, key international players like the JDT as 
well as the USA, China and the EU Joint Programming Initiative for South Sudan19 (among 
others) have also been providing massive security, technical and humanitarian support to 
foster long-term peace and development in South Sudan.  
                                                          
17CfPS is a unique movement of local peace-building organisations from Sudan and South Sudan working 
together to build sustainable peace especially at local community and tribal levels. 
18Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Canada work in collaboration with civil 
society partners, the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, USAID and NGOs to support 
sustainable peace, poverty reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (Joint Donor 
Team, 2012). 
19The European Union (EU) Joint Programming initiative for South Sudan is headed by the Netherlands and 
works in cooperation with other international partners. They are developing the water sector, enhancing 
rural development and food security, with a particular contribution from the Netherlands in the 
peacekeeping mission under the UNMISS, policing, promoting the rule of law, civil affairs and human rights 
for the development and security (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in South Sudan, 2012: 2). 
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3.4. Progress in the Implmentation of Development Objectives 
Since independence in 2011, South Sudan has experienced a range of challenges, 
opportunities and accomplishments. Despite the challenges of building a new country out 
of the ruins of war, South Sudan and its external allies have made significant strides in 
initiating development projects to overcome the problems that confront the country’s post-
conflict (re)construction plans. As a result of these collective efforts, notable achievements 
have been recorded in the following areas (UN in South Sudan, 2011: 4; Grande, 2012): 
 32 ministries and 17 independent commissions and chambers have been 
established. 
 
 A fully functioning legislative assembly has also been established and has passed 
more than 30 pieces of essential legislation. 
 
 A national parliament, governor’s offices and assemblies have been established in 
each of South Sudan’s ten states. The Republic of South Sudan’s Transnational 
Constitution represents the foundation of governance. 
  
 Key rule of law institutions have been established including a police service, a 
prison service, and a judiciary. 
 
 More than 6,000 kilometres of earth road have been reconstructed linking major 
cities and towns and the Juba International airport has been upgraded. 
 
 The number of children enrolling at and attending primary school has multiplied, 
the number of school buildings has increased by 20 percent and new primary and 
secondary schools are under construction. 
 
 In the area of health, more than three million children have been vaccinated against 




In parallel with South Sudan’s quest for political solutions to internal problems and the 
diplomatic settlement of the disputes with the Sudan over the outstanding CPA issues, the 
GoSS has also sought ways and means to accelerate the implementation of its plans to 
create viable alternatives to the Sudan oil transport infrastructure. As indicated earlier, an 
agreement to transport oil exports through Kenya was signed in January 2012 between the 
GoSS and the Government of Kenya (Globalpost, 2012).  This has the potential to serve 
South Sudan's short-term needs and long-term interests. The short-term needs take the 
form of South Sudan’s ability to resume the generation of sustained oil revenues that will 
strengthen its position in handling the challenges it encounters. In the long-term South 
Sudan will develop critical infrastructure, as Kenya is, and will remain, the gateway for 
South Sudan's exports and imports. Adding to these achievements, the recent Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)20 that was passed by the USA government also speaks 
to South Sudan’s achievement. This Act gave South Sudan the advantage of duty-free access 
to USA market (Kuacjok Herald News, 2012), thus placing South Sudan in a position where 
it stands to benefit economically and enhance economic development.  
      
The above-mentioned achievements and continuing developments in post-independence 
South Sudan are evidence of remarkable progress for such a young state. However, the 
fragile state of peace remains a major concern. Insecurity resulting from the cross-border 
resource conflicts and internal ethnic conflicts; the wide-ranging complaints arising from 
deficiencies in representation and inclusion in the politics of the state; and the economic 
hardships caused by South Sudan's reliance on the oil pipelines that transport its crude oil 
through the Sudan, have continued to impact negatively on the attainment of durable peace 
and stability in South Sudan. These drawbacks lay the platform on which to further explore 
and validate the argument that, aside the problems of cross-border resource conflicts, 
internal ethnic divisions also have damning effects on development and peace-building 
efforts in post-independence South Sudan. 
 
                                                          
20 The AGOAis a legislation approved by the USA government in May 2000, and aims to provide real and 
considerable supports for African countries (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) to continue their attempts and 
endeavours to open their economies and build free markets (Kuacjok Herald News). 
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3.5. Key and Persistent Challenges to Development Objectives 
 
Resource conflicts generally have substantial negative impacts on the development, 
peace and stability of a state and the potential to prolong conflict, as has been the case with 
the DRC and Nigeria, and as was the case with the Sudan’s second civil war, Sierra Leone, 
Angola and Chad. There is overwhelming evidence, especially in Africa, that countries rich 
in natural and mineral resources are the most vulnerable to resource conflicts or conflicts 
attributable to the resource cause/curse.  According to Collier (2009: 2), countries that are 
relatively poor, with a shrinking economy and that are heavily dependent on natural 
resources for development and sustainability, are prone to, and face the risk of 
experiencing a civil war. Natural resource wealth (oil), which is one of South Sudan’s 
greatest financial endowments, has proven to be an ongoing source of conflict and rivalry 
between South Sudan and Sudan, as well as internally within South Sudan. The struggle 
over the ownership and maintenance of control over resources and land in the Abyei 
region and the Blue Nile, and for a share of resource profits and benefits has continued to 
undermine the ability of the South Sudanese government to focus on effective economic 
(re)construction and development and peace and stability.  
 
The DRC presents a good case where natural resources fuelled and continue to fuel 
conflicts for decades, especially in the Eastern Congo. While the war in the DRC was 
formally terminated in 2003, there have been continuous reports by the UN and news 
agencies that post-conflict DRC has remained fragile and conflict prone. This is attributed 
to the widespread illegal exploitation of natural resources, particularly by rebel groups in 
the North and South Kivu provinces, and also to poor political and economic governance, 
on the one hand, and the inability of international organisations to usher in change to 
improve the management of the natural resources (Burnley, 2011: 7; International Crisis 
Group, 2012).  
  
Resource conflicts have included using the proceeds of mineral resources exploitation to 
finance various armed groups and military units in the DRC, as they fight for control over 
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mining areas in the eastern provinces; while the government has been unable to use its 
resources to generate income and improve the quality of life of its citizens (Burnley, 2011: 
7-8). Given that one of the causes that ignited the DRC civil war was linked to the issue of 
resources, and considering that in the aftermath of the war, the country remains plagued 
by resource conflicts, it can be argued that the resources in the DRC are not only an 
instigator and perpetuator of conflict, but also a source of damage to economic 
development, peace-building and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict DRC. Taking 
cognisance of the impact natural resources exert on development and conflict in the DRC, 
this study contends that the resource factor, primarily externally with the Sudan, and its 
potential to cause deep internal  tensions within South Sudan constitutes one of the major  
threats to development and the attainment of sustainable peace in post-conflict South 
Sudan.  
 
Resource-driven tensions have continued to exacerbate episodes of cross-border conflicts 
between South Sudan and Sudan, resulting in the increase in the oil transit fee by Sudan 
and the eventual shut down of oil production by South Sudan. The question of resource-
driven disputes and their potential for conflict extends to land ownership and the land 
tenure system in South Sudan.  The major disputes over resources and access to grazing 
land by livestock owners in South Sudan have, in certain cases, been the cause of internal 
tensions. But as the economy improves with larger farming and agricultural projects and 
attendant urbanization, the land tenure system will constitute another key source of 
potential conflict with South Sudan. Such resource conflicts may continue to obfuscate the 
peace process in South Sudan, thus exposing the country to a resource curse.  
 
Conflict over natural resources can be triggered by several factors. Humphreys (2005: 
511), identifies these as: the possible engagement of domestic groups in ‘quasi-criminal’ 
activity to benefit from resources independent from the state; and the use of the resources 
by third parties, states and internal and external organisations as an incentive to engage in 
and/or promote civil conflicts. Moreover, it may lead to the problem of resource grievances 
– resulting from the method of extraction that may cause environmental damage and loss 
of land rights, unfair distribution among the various local groups, and the over-dependence 
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of state economies on natural resource exportation revenues and less on other 
commodities like manufacturing and agriculture for their export earnings (Humphreys, 
2005: 512-513). While resource dependence may also create weak state structures and 
weak state-society relationships, the GoSS’s concentration on resolving the resource and 
border conflict with Sudan has so far overshadowed its capacity to attend to and resolve 
resources and land problems internal to South Sudan; these are manifest in inter-ethnic 
conflicts.  
 
Internal ethnic conflicts in South Sudan remain a grave danger to the peace and stability 
of the state. Ethnic conflicts, especially in Africa, have predominantly revolved around 
ethnic identity with severe consequences for individuals or groups’ political inclinations, 
prospects for economic development and security. Ethnicity or ethnic diversity has 
featured prominently in conflict literature and discourses, as provoking violent and 
prolonged social conflicts along ethnic lines and having devastating human and material 
consequences, as was the case in Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, the DRC and Sudan. Ethnicity is 
a social phenomenon. According to Carment and James (2000: 176), ethnic divisions and 
mobilisation along new politically based identities is a feature of transitional societies, 
where human/civil populations are able to respond to changes in political power.  
 
Before South Sudan’s independence, Sudan was an ethnically diverse and mixed country. 
This diversity is considered to have been one of the root causes of the Sudan-South Sudan 
conflict, as well as the internal divisions in pre-and post-independent South Sudan. While 
ethnic conflict and disparities fragmented the social, economic and political relations 
between Sudan and South Sudan, they have remained a cause of disunity in the sovereign 
state of South Sudan, causing massive displacement of the local population; suspicion, 
mistrust and fear between the various ethnic groups. A major concern is the fact that in the 
face of difficulties emanating from ethnic cleavages, leaders are likely to mobilise their 
members against threats from the other ethnic groups (Carment & James, 2000: 175), as is 
the case with the Dinka and the Nuer ethnicities or Nuer and Murle. Carment and James 
(2000: 175) note that when states are faced with the relatively important and daunting 
 
 82 
responsibilities of political and economic liberalisation (as is the case with South Sudan), 
ethnic resentment can be nurtured and ethnic animosity is further influenced by 
institutional, political and international decision-making and relations.  
 
Ethnic conflict in South Sudan remains one of the major challenges impacting on peace-
building and prosperity. High levels of poverty; the relatively high dependence on oil 
resources for sustainability; and the lack of political and economic representation of the 
majority of the local ethnic groups in state affairs, play crucial roles in fuelling ethnic 
tensions and occasional confrontations in South Sudan; this could evolve into widespread, 
violent conflicts. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002: 5) alluding to Mauro (1995), argue 
that ethnic conflicts have the propensity to create severe societal disintegration that may 
affect investment and the country’s economic prosperity and welfare, increase public and 
political corruption, cause political instability, and in worst case scenarios, transform into a 
civil war. In Kenya, for example, the wave of inter-ethnic conflicts that plagued the country 
in 1991 had devastating consequences for civil society and the political and socio-economic 
development of the country as a whole. Aside from the colonial legacy, among other factors, 
Nyukuri (1997: 8-12) attributed the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts that ravaged Kenya to 
the scramble for scarce national resources and land, which for a long time remained a 
thorny economic and political issue in Kenya, and to efforts on the part of influential 
government leadership to re-establish a federal system of government based on ethnicity. 
While Kenya’s ethnic crisis did not translate into civil war, its consequences included the 
indiscriminate loss of human lives; enormous destruction of human and economic 
resources; food insecurity and the disruption of agricultural activities; the permanent 
alteration of land ownership arrangements; an increase in ethnic enmity and bigotry, and 
the embracing of ethnic politics (Nyukuri, 1997: 15-28). According to Carment, James and 
Taydas (2006: 1), such politicisation of ethnicity poses a major threat to the stability of a 
democratic state. 
 
This perspective of the causes and consequences of the ethnic clashes in Kenya, consistent 
with other cases in Africa like the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda (except for the fact that 
in these cases, the ethnic conflicts translated into civil wars), provides ground for concern 
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about the direction the internal ethnic conflict might take in South Sudan. South Sudan’s 
prolonged history of conflict with Sudan is sufficient evidence of the devastation, the tragic 
effects and the long-term impacts civil wars can have on the development of a state. While 
this point cannot be overemphasised, it is important to state that the overlap of the 
resource, ethnic and political representation challenges to peace-building efforts speak to 
the obvious, which is that these concerns are of prime importance to South Sudan. 
 
This raises a number of questions: what are the GoSS and stakeholders doing or failing to 
do so that the desired level of peace remains a major challenge? What mechanisms can be 
put in place to manage the complex situations that are the backdrops to insecurity, and to 
enhance efforts that will lead to the creation of sustainable peace and development? To 
answer these questions, the next chapter argues for the need for peace-building efforts and 
activities to be coordinated internally throughout the various South Sudanese 
constituencies. This is because; the weak institutional legacy South Sudan inherited has 
constrained coordination among stakeholders in South Sudan, despite the efforts by all 
involved parties to collaborate effectively.  The sheer numbers of stakeholders in South 
Sudan, the complexity of sectors the stakeholders are involved in, the limited physical 
infrastructure, and the limited human resources at the disposal of South Sudan have 
rendered coordination a challenging task. Notwithstanding these constraints, evidences 
from the GoSS and intenational involvement in South Sudan peace processes, as indicated 
above, portrays that effective coordination characterises the state-building activities, 
resource management, and conflict mediation with the Sudan.  However, coordination 
challenges are encountered in the management and resolution of violent conflicts in 
promoting harmony among and between ethnic goups, especially in managing the domestic 
political space, in the coordination of development interventions, and in public 
accountability. On this basis, the chapter further discusses the need for internal and 
external stakeholders to facilitate the coordination processes, as well as encourage the 






This historical and contextual analysis of South Sudan’s post-CPA and post-independence 
challenges has demonstrated that a blend of internal and external factors contribute to 
fragility in post-conflict societies: a situation most often caused by the precarious balance 
that exists between the threat of conflict resumption (domestic and foreign) and the  
potential to build, maintain, and consolidate peace. South Sudan’s transition from a 
resistance movement to an independent state presented a forward-looking perspective for 
the South Sudanese under the new status of a sovereign country, ready to govern itself 
outside the shadow of Sudan’s authority. However, many challenges block South Sudan’s 
path to sustainable peace and development.  
 
The magnitude and complexity of South Sudan’s underdevelopment and the difficulties 
encountered by the South Sudanese government, albeit with generous support from the 
international community, in building an entirely new state after decades of devastating 
wars cannot be overemphasised. It should be noted that the sincere efforts jointly exerted 
by the stakeholders – the GoSS, the AU and IGAD, the UN, bilateral donors, international 
and national NGOs, (and others) – to manage and surmount South Sudan’s numerous 
challenges in state-building; in handling the difficulties originating in South Sudan's rich 
ethnic diversity and the ongoing conflict with the Sudan over the unresolved CPA issues 
(including the burning issue of the dispute with the Sudan over the oil transit fees); have 
yielded encouraging progress in laying the foundation for building the institutions and 
infrastructure of an emerging state. Judging by the GoSS's ability to maintain the current 
status quo, despite the incessant latent conflict with the Sudan and internal turbulence, it is 
not an oversimplification to state that South Sudan's current challenges pale in the face of 
the promising opportunities, if the country respects the priorities dictated by South 
Sudan's realities.   
 
Post-independence South Sudan has many competing priorities and the way in which the 
GoSS, with the support of and in partnership with the international community, addresses 
these priorities will impact the country for generations to come.  The review of South 
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Sudan’s challenges and efforts has shown that state-building projects and rivalries over 
resources and borders have taken primacy on the agendas of both internal and external 
stakeholders, and have overshadowed other equally pressing priorities. This has raised 
questions among South Sudanese intellectuals and influential personalities, observers, 
allies, and friends of South Sudan as to whether sufficient resources, efforts, and attention 
are being dedicated to the equally important domestic issues of social and national identity, 
and access to opportunities on the part of various communities and ethnic groups within 
the heterogeneous South Sudanese population. This dimension of the conflict equation is 
strategically crucial as its mishandling or neglect would constitute an even greater threat to 
prospects for sustainable national unity, stability, development, peace, and the security of 
the emerging South Sudan.  This gap in addressing the challenges at the forefront of South 
Sudan’s current crisis sheds light on the enormity of the task the GoSS has shouldered in its 
drive to develop a new nation-state. It underscores the fact that the GoSS, which emerged 
from decades of devastating conflict and inherited next to nothing in terms of functioning 
state institutions, is and will continue to be overwhelmed by this daunting task without the 
active and enduring support of the international community.   
 
The stakes in South Sudan and Sudan’s relationships could not be higher: deteriorating 
relationships will harm both countries, whereas good neighbourly cooperation will benefit 
them. Both countries could gain from developing common, constructive, mutually 
beneficial relationships while drawing on each other’s strengths, and responsibly managing 
the outstanding issues from the CPA of 2005 – oil transit fees, Abyei, citizenship of 
nationals, among other issues. 
 
Where the South Sudanese government focuses its attention is critical, despite the legacy of 
poor governance and weak state infrastructure.  The pursuit of domestic policies that 
recognise and appreciate South Sudan's diversity will strengthen the South Sudanese state.  
From a position of citizen-sanctioned strength, the GoSS will be able to dissuade internal 
dissonance, meet the growing expectations of its people for political inclusion and fair 
representation, and develop social services across the country – desires the South 
Sudanese yearned for and that were held at bay for far too long.  However, the attainment 
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of these goals will very much depend on the government and stakeholders’ abilities to 
encourage dialogue, confidence building, mutual relationships and national and societal 
cohesion among the conflicting parties and groups. South Sudan has welcomed allies and 
partners in its journey of state-building. The UN and its specialised agencies, the AU, IGAD, 
bilateral donors, NGOs (national and international) and CSOs have through active 
collaboration, gradually enhanced coordination, enabled synergies of benefits and 
optimised the impact of their interventions in development, peace-keeping, security and 
the administrative sectors.  
 
The main purpose of the next chapter is to provide recommendations to address and 
manage South Sudan’s challenges by employing the theoretical framework of John Paul 
Lederach’s Pyramid Model. This model sets out mechanisms to coordinate peace-building 
activities across various levels and communities of the conflict/post-conflict society as a 





4. Framework for Managing South Sudan’s Challenges: 
Application of John Paul Lederach’s Pyramid Model 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Having examined the complex challenges impinging on South Sudan’s transformation and 
peace-building capacities, this chapter focuses on providing recommendations to address 
such challenges. This is done by examining the processes and goals of conflict 
transformation and peace-building (CTPB); and how Lederach’s Pyramid Model (the 
recommended model for managing South Sudan’s challenges) fits into the broad 
framework to achieve South Sudan’s peace-building expectations. 
 
As argued in the previous chapter, (re)constructing and developing post-conflict and post-
independence South Sudan is work in progress that is exposed to a number of serious 
challenges. These challenges persist, despite the invaluable efforts and contributions of the 
government and stakeholders in various transformation and peace-building processes. 
Increasing attention has been given to building state institutions and infrastructure and to 
resolving the unresolved resource and border land problems. The persistent disputes with 
Sudan over territorial demarcation, transit fees, trade, and citizenship have been a source 
of economic antagonism; the growing internal ethnic divisions and conflicts in South Sudan 
and the problem of poor/weak political governance – the concentration of political power 
in the hands of a few and deficiencies in the broader political representation of all South 
Sudanese – have remained among the most pressing obstacles hindering progress towards 
sustainable peace. Deliberating on why these challenges remain a problem in South Sudan, 
this section presents three main reasons: the lack of a consistent and all-inclusive approach 
for broad-based involvement of the society in its own peace-building and development 
programmes; shortcomings in initiating, reconciling and building peaceful and mutually 
beneficial relationships, which are of central value to the theory and practice of conflict 
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transformation; and the inadequacy or lack of coordination, cooperation and cohesion 
among the existing societal and local community efforts.  
 
Persistent challenges to peace can be attributed to many different causes. According to 
Maphosa (2010: 711) one such cause includes the fact that not all peace-building activities 
may be positive or yield the expected constructive outcome.   Jackson (2006: 25) notes that 
ineffectual management of the prevalent nature of African conflicts that most often centres 
on settling political differences among warring factions does not guarantee a long-term 
solution capable of ending protracted conflict or ensuring the sustainability of peace. 
Furthermore, attaining and building viable peace remains subject to a multitude of 
complexities because the international community’s diplomatic initiatives to transform 
conflicts and build peace often inadvertently disregard and marginalise some activities as 
peripheral and of little importance to what they consider key activities in the process of 
conflict transformation (Jackson, 2006: 26). Jackson further outlines that these activities 
include the (re)building of national identity and the deconstruction of violent identity, 
which in the case of South Sudan is also a major challenge to peace. 
 
Identifying the context in which constructive transformation can be realised, as described 
in chapter one, this study adopted John Paul Lederach’s theoretical framework of conflict 
transformation. Lederach’s theory, known as the Pyramid Model, provides a contextual 
understanding of the activities and approaches which support the participation and 
involvement of the population from “top to bottom and from bottom to top” in building 
peace within post-conflict societies. The application of this theory, as the most suitable 
framework for managing South Sudan’s challenges, provides a practical method of 
underpinning peace-building activities that are based on insight into and the resources 
available to the conflict-afflicted society at large. This model proposes a set of peace-
building activities through which leadership at all levels – top, middle, and grassroots – 
would coordinate their various efforts towards a reconciliatory, common process that will 
enable the building of relationships and trust, cooperation and societal cohesion. As such, 
the model will address South Sudan’s challenges in order of the centrality of the elements 
of conflict transformation and peace-building processes in the aftermath of violent strife. 
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According to Maiese (2003(b)) these processes should consist of three fundamental 
dimensions: addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships, 
and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level. Furthermore, Mitchell (2012: 
3) proposes that the processes should focus on: (1) activities that will develop and 
strengthen non-violent relationships at the local level between conflicting and distrustful 
constituencies, and (2) activities that will impel the conflict leaders and militia groups at 
the national level to engage in efforts to minimise and lessen the effects of violence and 
undertake confidence-building actions in organising meaningful negotiations to resolve the 
conflict. 
 
4.2. Conflict Transformation and Peace-Building Processes 
Conflict transformation is based on the constructive and long-term development of peace 
and security in divided societies through the development of norms and knowledge; the 
development and support of institutions for peaceful conflict management; and the 
elimination of structural risk factors (Akerlund, 2005: 11). Long-term development relates 
to the process of building peace, which, according to CARE International (2010: 7) 
recognises and supports the central role that local actors and processes play in ending 
violence and constructively addressing both the immediate effects and structural causes of 
violent conflict. Failure to address the causes of conflict contributes to structural risk 
factors. These include issues that threaten the core interests of the conflict parties and the 
capacity of the local community to manage conflict without violence. Akerlund (2005: 11) 
adds that if these factors are not adequately explored, they in turn cause conflict 
challenges. This is manifest in recurrent episodes of conflicts, as is the case with South 
Sudan’s cross-border and internal conflicts. 
 
Reychler (2001: 12) states that the defining objective of peace-building is to transform 
conflict in a manner that is constructively sustainable. For Schirch (2008: 8), peace-
building is a process of building relationships and institutions that support the peaceful 
transformation of conflict. Constructive conflict transformation therefore, involves three 
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inter-related elements (DFID – Department for International Development (2010: 14), as 
follows:  
 
1. Addressing the causes and effects of conflict. The causes often include social, 
political or economic exclusion, which are based on ethnicity, religion or unequal 
power relations between the centre and periphery. This further requires 
confronting and responding to drivers or triggers of conflict, such as youth 
unemployment, economic shocks or access to light weapons. It also entails 
addressing the devastating effects and consequences of violent conflict, to enable 
communities to recover and reconcile.  
 
2. Building mechanisms to resolve conflict peacefully involves strengthening local, 
national and regional capacity to prevent and resolve conflict in non-violent ways. 
This is crucial during all phases of conflict and peace-building (DFID – Department 
for International Development (2010: 15). 
 
3. Supporting inclusive peace processes and agreements provides a focus for peace-
building efforts, and often relies heavily on international support to succeed. This 
process aims to achieve a peace agreement that is sustainable and lays a strong 
foundation for a new political settlement (DFID – Department for International 
Development (2010: 15).  
 
Generally, peace-building encompasses a wide range of processes and engages different 
actors in the exercise of multiple peace-building activities. According to Truger (2001: 35), 
the goals of peace-building need to correlate with the needs of the conflict-affected 
population and be compatible with civil society. It also needs to be non-violent and distinct 
from enforcement actions, flexible and practical, and capable of responding to violent 
escalations. For these goals to be achieved, Truger (2001: 35-36) envisages a series of 
peace-building activities as being of great importance to the process of constructive conflict 
change. These include: mediation and confidence building among conflict parties; 
humanitarian assistance (including food aid, water, sanitation and health care); 
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reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants; rehabilitation and 
(re)construction; stabilisation of economic structures and empowerment for political 
participation. These activities or categories covered by the peace-building umbrella should 
be realised through organised international and local actions in the conflict or post-conflict 
environment (Truger, 2001: 36).  
 
As a nation born out of prolonged violent conflict, South Sudan is well-positioned to fully 
comprehend the benefits that derive from adopting mediation as a central strategy to 
resolve domestic and external conflicts.  This explains South Sudan’s pursuit of a mediated 
resolution of the issues outstanding from the CPA with the Sudan, which has been 
promoted in a series of AU initiatives. This is a relevant starting point for addressing the 
antagonism. Mediation remains the approach of choice, as it is capable of narrowing the 
gaps and differences between and among the diverse and rich ethnic groups of South 
Sudan.  In the domestic sphere, South Sudan's embrace of mediation would need to 
manifest itself in tangible development interventions such as schools, clinics, medical 
supplies (in which there have been progressive developments, as indicated in chapter 
three), personal safety and security provided by the South Sudan government; and by 
delivering effective, fair, and equitable urgent humanitarian assistance to communities 
affected by natural and manmade crisis.   
 
As a natural outcome of South Sudan's armed struggle for independence, the new country 
inherited a large contingent of former combatants; many of whom were absorbed into the 
South Sudan military.  The phenomenon of former rebels is an important factor in the 
peaceful transformation of countries emerging from armed conflicts. Well-organised 
demobilisation and rehabilitation programmes and the successful reintegration of former 
combatants and soldiers into society would constitute a necessary security stabilisation 
step.  The manner in which South Sudan handles this element in the conflict management 
equation will have strategic implications for stability in South Sudan.   
 
Diagram 2 below projects the different peace-building activities proposed by Schirch 
(2008: 9), who asserts that how tactical a peace-building process is, very much depends on 
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the ability of peace-builders and actors/stakeholders to complement one another; 
coordinate and manage resources, peace activities and strategies in a manner that will 
accomplish multiple goals and address multiple issues in the long-term (Maphosa, 2010: 
711).  
 
Diagram 2: Categories of Peace-building — (Schirch, 2008: 9) 
 
 
The above presentation of the goals and processes of peace-building sets out a progressive 
pattern of building peace that moves from ceasefire to the constructive transformation of 
conflict relations. The cycle of peace-building represents a set of activities that relies on 
different strategies and techniques, but are overlapping and the success of each is 
dependent on the others; however, collectively, they support peace as a central goal. These 
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that are slated to be achieved over different time frames. Are these processes a possible 
solution to manage South Sudan’s challenges? The peace-building pyramid examines and 
classifies these processes in three distinct categories of: high level negotiations; problem-
solving workshops; and social healing/building relationships (Lederach, 1997: 39).  These 
approaches are spread out across three major types of leadership within the conflict 
country. In Lederach’s view, the essence of these processes is how they are coordinated 
and managed across the society, implying that the harmonisation of peace-building 
activities as well as efficient leadership provides the backdrop for effective conflict 
transformation and reconciliation of differences and relationships. This is an important 
step in building trust and cooperation to maintain a positive peace culture and consolidate 
state-society relations in post-conflict societies like South Sudan.   
 
4.3. Application of the Pyramid Model and its Implications for South 
Sudan 
Managing the challenges that hamper South Sudan’s ability to achieve sustainable peace is 
critically important for breaking the ongoing cycle of violence internally and between 
South Sudan and Sudan. Building viable internal and external relations will require sincere 
dialogue, and an inclusive and interactive problem-solving process that will enhance the 
prospects of empowerment and confidence building. This is necessary if South Sudan’s is to 
attain its long-term objectives of a sustainable political and socio-economic environment, 
which also depends on how its peace-building activities are coordinated at the various 
levels of leadership.   
 
4.3.1. Top Level Leadership 
Lederach (1997: 38) asserts that ‘level-1’ leaders are key political and military leaders who 
are the highest representatives of the government and opposition movements in internal 
conflicts. Lederach further indicates that, these leaders are at the top of the pyramid. 
Though few, they are the key actors within the wider setting of the peace-building 
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framework. According to Notter and Diamond (1996: 5), they engage in political peace-
building processes that are concerned with high level political negotiations. They provide a 
comprehensive framework for understanding the relationships between the conflict 
parties and their resources. The aim of this process is to establish a comprehensive 
structure that can address the political needs and manage the limitations of a peace system. 
Activities include negotiations, fact-finding missions and technical working groups (Notter 
& Diamond, 1996: 5). 
Diagram 3: Top Level Leadership in South Sudan 
 
At this level, the peace-building roles of the external/international community are a very 
important asset in assisting the conflict and/or post-conflict society in the transitioning 
process to sustainable peace and development. As illustrated in chapter three, the AU, 
IGAD, UN, EU, Kenya, and the USA (among others) constitute this group of international 
actors and have been actively engaged in various peace-building endeavours – supporting 
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South Sudan and Sudan to arrive at a peaceful resolution of their differences and providing 
the resources for capacity building.  The IGAD-led negotiations with the support of the USA 
and the IGAD Partners Friends are a case in point. The UN efforts in South Sudan continue 
to be realised through the work of its different departments and partner organisations; for 
example, UNMISS’ support for the implementation of the CPA since 2005 and its 
engagement in efforts to establish and enhance peace, security and the conditions for the 
effective development of South Sudan since independence in 2011. The AU has also been 
involved in high-level negotiations to resolve resource and land conflicts especially over 
the status of the Abyei district between the Sudans. These negotiations, mediated by 
IGAD/the AU with the support of the UN and other bodies, continue between the 
governments of South Sudan and Sudan, with influential roles reserved for leaders of the 
ruling political parties in the Sudan (the NCP) and South Sudan (SPLM). The most recent 
agreement resulting from such negotiations was the September 27, 2012 security 
arrangements and agreement on the status of Abyei and other disputed border areas, like 
the Mile 14 – a disputed area of grazing land located between Northern Bahr El-Ghazal 
State in South Sudan and East Darfur State in Sudan (Safi, 2012).  
 
The objective of the several negotiations over Abyei region has been to achieve a 
settlement between the two governments. In spite of the ongoing efforts, the final status of 
the disputed regions remains unresolved and a sensitive matter obstructing peace in South 
Sudan. Moreover, the land and resources issues that are internal to South Sudan and are 
crucial points of tension, instability, and conflict have been continuously overshadowed 
and are not accorded the same attention as the cross-border issues by this level of 
leadership. The continuous stalemate in resolving the external resources and land issues 
indicates the strained relations, at the highest leadership levels, between South Sudan and 
Sudan. This will not be settled through the imposition of agreement(s) that are not fully 
and broadly supported by the highest echelons in both countries, but rather through a 
process of sourcing strategies on how to address the damaged relationships, which 





Policy Implications for South Sudan: This level of leadership as presented in the 
pyramid model (Lederach, 1997: 45) comprises the top-level leaders – the governments of 
South Sudan and Sudan, and the representative leaders of the NCP, the SPLM and SPLA – 
who have the strategic responsibility to chart the road to peace. This depends on the 
effectiveness of their leadership and whether the two leadership groups can find common 
grounds to agree on a more comprehensive framework. An opportunity exists for both 
countries to address their long-simmering conflicts and manage their differences, if they 
engage in genuine dialogue as the first significant step to sustainable settlement. Such 
dialogue needs to involve other groups (not necessarily supporters of either government) 
that are engaged in the resource and land conflicts, such as the SPLM-N, SSDM, SSDF and 
the NUF; as well as the leaders of the conflicted border regions. This implies that the 
mediators would have to invite these groups and leaders to the negotiations. Embracing 
such a comprehensive approach at this level would set the platform for possible 
participation by multiple leaders and create an environment that would enhance the 
interdependence of the rest of society and activities towards establishing viable peace in 
the long term. 
 
4.3.2. Middle Level Leadership 
At this level of peace-building, leaders, including NGOs, highly-respected individuals, 
religious groups, academic institutions and humanitarian organisations (whose positions 
are neither defined, connected or controlled by government structures or the major 
opposition movement) engage in what are called ‘structural peace-building activities’ 
(Lederach, 1997: 41). Structural peace-building activities include: problem-solving 
workshops; conflict resolution training; and peace commissions; they aim to support the 
political processes in level-1. This facilitates conflict transformation. This process 
comprises of economic development programmes, strengthening democracy and 
governance, and supporting the creation of indigenous NGOs to enhance their support for 
local peace-building projects and the implementation of a peace culture (Notter & 
Diamond, 1996: 5).  
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According to Dudouet (2006: 36) the middle range leaders are considered key agents of 
change in conflict situations since they have the ability to influence decision-making; 
encourage and sustain local groups and community development activities; build peace 
constituencies; organise training conferences, workshops and informal meetings between 
political opponents and warring groups – to facilitate, empower and strengthen their 
peace-building capacities; and assist in reconciliation processes (Miall, 2004: 14). Potential 
‘level-2’ leaders in South Sudan would include, but are not limited to, South Sudanese 
religious leaders, tribal chiefs, influential personalities, and even moderates from the Sudan 
who can bridge the gaps between the disputants on both sides of the border.  
 
Recognizing the importance of middle level leaders many organizations have initiated 
interventions on this entry point.  Since 2010 (prior to South Sudan’s independence in 
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2011), the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS) and the Sudanese Organization 
for Nonviolence and Development (SONAD) have been working in collaboration with 
Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) – an INGO to provide practical skills in preventing violence in 
several states in South Sudan (Nonviolent Peaceforce – South Sudan Project. 2011). To this 
effect, the NP in partnership with IPCS and SONAD put in place Sudanese-led violence 
prevention teams to assist in traditional dispute settlement and peace-building activities in 
regions that stand at high risk of serious violent confrontations. Furthermore, the NP, IPCS 
and SONAD continue to work with local groups to foster dialogue and train civil society 
leaders, traditional and community leaders, elected officials, civil servants, and the military 
workforces on how to empower and build confidence in their communities, and how to 
engage nonviolent mechanisms to reduce and/or prevent violence (Nonviolent Peaceforce 
– South Sudan Project. 2011). In this scenario, the NP and its South Sudan partners 
continue to relate with both the top and grassroots levels of the society in an effort to 
support and promote nation-wide peace. 
 
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) has also been 
involved in several projects – aimed to promote peace, reconciliation, and peacebuilding 
initiatives at the national, provincial, and grassroots levels in post-independent South 
Sudan. For instance, in April 2012, ACCORD hosted a three days Dialogue Forum in Malakal, 
Upper Nile State of South Sudan (ACCORD, 2012(a)). This forum – one of ACCORD’s many 
programmes under its Conflict Transformation Initiative brought together a wide range of 
participants from South Sudan including representatives from the government, civil 
society, youth organisations, women groups, traditional leaders, UNMISS personnel, and 
the academia to engage in peace-building discourses and skills training (ACCORD, 2012(a)).  
The forum, which convened to exchange ideas on addressing insecurity and promote 
peace-building initiatives in South Sudan, was concluded with recommendations on how to 
advance and support the Peace Commission of South Sudan. In addition, ACCORD, through 
the South Sudan Initiative (SSI) has continued to work with South Sudan’s Peace 
Commission to meet the country’s 2011 to 2013 strategic objectives and policy 
frameworks, and to provide training on conflict management, mediation, and negotiation to 




Among the faith-based organisations, the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has 
significant potential to play a role in reconciliation, conflict transformation, and peace-
building by virtue of their intimate knowledge and respect of the communities' traditions, 
and community links and outreach - transcending denominational boundaries. Through its 
humanitarian work over the years, the NSCC has promoted calls for peace during the 
outbreak of violent conflict (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2006: 7).  In its People 
to People Peace Process initiative, the NSCC employed traditional methods of conflict 
resolution and reconciliation at grassroots community levels and engaged the Nuer and 
Dinka traditional leaders in a conference, which led to the resolution of the conflict 
between the two ethnic groups (Ouko, 2004: 1). By means of dialogue and presentation 
forums, the NSCC also influenced the parties to the CPA peace negotiations to consider the 
inclusion of human rights in the CPA (Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2006: 72). 
Though not much has been detailed on middle level peace-building in post-independent 
South Sudan, the NSCC's past experience in employing traditional mechanisms to resolve 
inter-ethnic conflicts attests to a  potential that would, combined with other initiatives, 
contribute to conflict transformation and peace-building in South Sudan. 
 
Policy Implications for South Sudan: Activities such as problem-solving workshops, 
otherwise known as interactive problem-solving or third party consultation, involve third 
party negotiations, and also bring together representatives of the various conflicting 
groups in an unofficial setting to participate in efforts aimed at transforming the conflict 
relations by seeking solutions to shared problems (Lederach, 1997: 46-47). According to 
Kelman (1990), problem-solving workshops offer a joint-problem solving approach and 
can also enable the conflict parties to work towards peaceful conflict resolution, as well as 
cooperate and find ways to assist one another to arrive at mutually accepted solutions. 
Reflecting on the case of South Sudan, the benefits of this approach also provide an 
interactive, flexible and neutral platform for conflicting parties and participants to analyse, 
discuss, and try to understand their difficulties from one another’s perspective (Maiese, 
2003(a)). It is also provides a setting for participants to nurture new ideas on how to 
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operate better in their conflict-torn societies and even provide support, facilitating the 
negotiating process (Maiese, 2003(a)). 
 
Engaging the conflict resolution training approach, as prescribed by the pyramid model, 
will also be useful in South Sudan in that, through such training or education, awareness 
will be raised about the ongoing conflicts and participants will also acquire skills to deal 
with the conflict. As stated by Lederach (1997: 48), this process can also be employed at all 
other levels of society and leadership. According to Kumar (1999: 4), the positive 
implication of this approach is that it gives individuals and groups the methods and skills to 
limit or avoid intra-group conflicts; and also enables the various groups to learn and 
develop their peace-building capacities. Additional middle level activities include building 
peace commissions. Peace commissions are usually made up of prominent individuals 
representing the different conflict factions. These commissions are often concerned with 
the creation and organisation of different peace and reconciliation activities, and the 
establishment of committees at the local, national and regional levels of society to engage 
these activities (Lederach, 1997: 50-51). 
 
Overall, the middle range involves extensive and worthwhile processes, which if employed 
to their full in South Sudan, have the potential to promote the attainment of sustainable 
peace in the long run. As Lederach noted, this model was successful in other situations in 
Africa, like in South Africa and Mozambique. The major policy implications of this model in 
South Sudan are that, it would provide different forums and opportunities for conflict 
parties to convene, negotiate and intensify organised efforts to address their differences. 
Individuals and groups’ participation in the interactive dialogue meetings and workshops 
would also assist the conflict parties to decide how to proceed with the resolution and 
building of broken relationships as a step towards sustaining peace, and would offer the 
third parties or intervening bodies a better understanding of the context and background 
to the problems. 
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4.3.3. Grassroots Leadership 
This level of leadership represents civil society or the masses and entire communities, 
cutting across divisions and affiliations.  These communities are often the most affected by 
conflicts, violent or otherwise. Grassroots leaders include local community leaders, local 
NGO leaders or developers, professional leaders, key service providers, business people, 
returned refugees’ leaders, refugee camp leaders, and ordinary citizens (Lederach, 1997: 
39). These leaders engage in what is known as social peace-building. According to Notter 
and Diamond (1996: 6), they are concerned with understanding the beliefs and values of 
the local people and groups as well as healing and building relationships. The rationale is to 
create a society that is committed to engendering a new “peace culture” within the social 
organisation of communal and inter-communal life. This peace-building process mainly 
involves training or dialogue programmes, such as local peace commissions, community 
dialogue projects or trauma healing at the grassroots level of the society (Lederach, 1997: 
39).  
 





In South Sudan, the grassroots leadership would consist of the traditional leaders of the 
various ethnic communities, leaders of local youth groups and leaders of women’s and 
church groups. Peace-building at the grassroots level in South Sudan is very important. 
This is because South Sudan’s major challenge to domestic peace emanates from ethnic 
divisions and conflicts, poverty and the marginalisation or less than optimal representation 
of the grassroots or local communities at the national level. According to Mckeon (2003: 2-
3), grassroots peace-building provides a practical approach to internal conflict. This is 
because, the processes develop from and draw on the distinct social and cultural resources 
and traditions of the local environment in which the conflict is manifest and the local 
communities seek to create a society less vulnerable to violence. As such, social inclusion 
and social reconciliation are central to grassroots peace-building, which aims to rebuild 
healthy relationships as a prerequisite for peaceful interaction between the inter-
dependent community groups (Mckeon, 2003: 3). Realising these goals requires the 
creation of platforms, such as inter-community meetings and gatherings, and community 
development programmes, where leaders and community members can engage in mutual 
dialogue and cooperative action.  
 
It is noteworthy to mention the paucity of reports or records on grassroots peace-building 
in post-independent South Sudan, considering that the grassroots organisations and 
movements are still embryonic.  However, as stated earlier in this chapter, ACCORD and the 
NP have created a platform wherein through training programmes, dialougue sessions and 
conferences, these two organisatons are reinforcing existing initiatives and opening new 
avenues to disseminate peace-building skills, mitigate violence and promote local peace 
initiatives. These interventions encourage “a need for increased local ownership to make 
peace-building activities sustainable; attention on the issue of ethnicity, particularly in 
relation to power dynamics in South Sudan; and the need to strengthen civil society” 
(ACCORD, 2011). Likewise, the NP and its South Sudan partners stress that: solutions to 
conflict must emanate from within the conflict communities; and if sustainable peace is to 
be achieved, then local solutions must be found to local problems; – thus the belief that 
engaging the grassroots level in peace-building efforts is without doubt an efficient 
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approach of solving conflict and building peace (Nonviolent Peaceforce – South Sudan 
Project, 2011). 
 
Policy Implications for South Sudan: Bottom-up peace-building helps to strengthen 
local communities. Reflecting on South Sudan, this model would bring local leaders 
together in joint efforts to promote a localised infrastructure and engage in strategies that 
would enhance communities’ constructive response to violence, providing relief, 
promoting human rights, improving security, and imparting and instituting comprehensive 
conflict change initiatives across various ethnic groups (Insight on Africa, 2011). According 
to Kumar (1999: 2), engaging the grassroots in peace-building activities would also help to 
facilitate and improve communication and the development of local skills to prevent or 
resolve conflict and reduce deep-rooted resentment and misunderstandings among divided 
ethnic groups. For Mckeon (2003:3), it would promote and create confidence within local 
community groups; this is very important to the effectiveness and viability of community-
based approaches. As illustrated by Lederach (1997: 52-54), the employment of this 
bottom-up model has been successful in the cases of Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Africa 
and Liberia.  
 
The critical factor in the conflict architecture in South Sudan however, has been the latent 
internal inter- and intra-ethnic conflict, which takes precedence over all other 
considerations.  The future of South Sudan hinges on resolving this key challenge.  
Lederach's model, with adaptations to the local conditions of South Sudan, provides the 
conflict management tools to address this challenge.  As ethnic diversity can serve the dual 
purposes of strengthening national unity and discord, South Sudan should guard against 
slipping into a situation where ethnic loyalties take primacy over national affiliation and 
where leaders may adopt policies that perpetuate ethnic divisions to the detriment of 
national South Sudan unity.   
 
The pyramid model and the situation on the ground in South Sudan imply that the 
realisation of the transformation and peace-building priorities outlined in the SSDP for 
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2011-2013 will need to be accompanied by measures to promote a genuine sense of 
national cohesion. This is especially important because in the multi-ethnic South Sudan, the 
inequalities causing internal conflicts are increasingly gaining ground; if policies are not 
adopted and implemented to address these economic, social, and political inequalities, the 
fast evolving divisions that continue to manifest in the form of internal ethnic conflicts pose 
a threat and may, in the future constitute a high risk of the outbreak of violent 
conflicts.  Given this, recognising ethnic diversity should not be restricted to empty 
promises and an exchange of pleasantries in conflict mediation forums. It would have to be 
supported by concrete and visible economic policies, programmes and projects that will 
convey the resolve and sincerity of South Sudan to address the concerns of all South 
Sudanese.  This implies that South Sudan would have to promote agriculture, the single 
largest economic sector that sustains more than 80 percent of South Sudanese households 
(Tizikara & Lugor, 2012: 3). This in turn will lead to economic development that will serve 
as a solid foundation for stronger national cohesion and improvements in social services, 
which naturally flow from political stability and economic prosperity. South Sudan is on the 
right path in allowing market forces to drive economic development, but given the 
prevailing economic disparities, policies that encourage equity and opportunity should be 
adopted by the government.  
 
South Sudan is at a crossroads, a situation it created by deciding to face the inevitable 
earlier rather than later, the pain ensuing from shutting down oil production and the 
consequence of losing more than 90 percent of the hard currency earnings of the country.  
Thus, South Sudan may need temporary financial support of a magnitude that will enable 
the country to undertake multiple initiatives to address internal and external challenges. 
The international community, with adequate safeguards in place, can play an important 
role in supporting South Sudan in this transition until such time as either the disputes with 
Sudan are resolved or alternative solutions are implemented. South Sudan's adoption of 
these policies is projected to generate internal harmony among all South Sudanese 
regardless of their ethnic differences, and the agricultural economy will be strengthened, 
internal and external trade will flourish, internal security will be enhanced and South 
Sudan's external relationships will be consolidated. Sudan may also realise the benefits that 
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can be gained from cooperating with South Sudan, thereby accelerating the resolution of 
the dispute between the two countries. 
 
Furthermore, the more meaningful inclusion of civil society and CSOs, particularly locally-
based organisations will contribute to better and more sustainable implementation of 
peace-building processes, because there will be trust and societal cooperation/cohesion. 
The processes presented in the pyramid model represent a framework for the state and 
civil society to work together. Thus, the contention that through coordinated efforts and 
engagement in the different peace-building activities, both the state and society will be able 
to exchange views on leadership-level experiences, build awareness and consensus around 
important principles and good practice related to the peace-building and development 
goals of the state and agree on representative objectives for action. While the government 
remains the lead actor, civil society and local organisations also have key roles to play in 
the realisation of stable peace and development in South Sudan.  
 
Overall, Lederach’s pyramid model underscores the fact that constructive transformation 
of conflicts requires the comprehensive engagement of coordinated actions and sustained 
reconciliation peace-building processes. However, reconciling warring parties or former 
conflicting groups is a necessary, yet lengthy and long-term process (Furley & May, 2006: 
7).  Furley and May (2006: 7) illustrate that this process involves the complex tasks of 
“erasing traumatic memories, employing traditional healing methods and amnesties to new 
institutional structures, such as truth and reconciliation commissions and promoting and 
defending human rights.” They suggest that these activities should be coordinated at 
government and civil society levels. Lederach emphasises the role of local actors in the 
conflict society, rather than external actors. Thus, the pyramid model limits the role of 
external actors to supporting and empowering the efforts of internal actors (Maphosa, 
2010: 714).  This aims to instil a sense of ownership and being a part of a comprehensive 
peace-building development in local actors, which will inspire them to commit to pooling 
their resources and put aside their differences to work for the greater good and 




For conflict transformation and peace building measures to be effective and responsive to 
the political and socio-economic challenges to peace and development in South Sudan, it is 
imperative for the government and stakeholders to encourage the active participation of 
civil society in both local and national peace-building efforts. Layson (2003) in Mitchell 
(2012: 3) states that “while national-level peace agreements may create a conducive space, 
they are not a guarantee that there will be instant peace in the communities. Thus, a lot of 
work will still need to be done at the grassroots level.” There is a need to create a sense of 
belonging and giving at all levels of society, especially the grassroots who are the most 
disadvantaged and affected by the conflict. Adopting this mechanism is particularly 
necessary in South Sudan, where internal clashes are increasing due to lack of/inadequate 
representation of majority ethnic groups in state affairs, among others.  
 
Drawing on the lessons drawn from the pyramid model, this study recommends the 
adoption, engagement and coordination of peace-building activities in South Sudan across 
the macro and micro levels of society. It also suggests activities and processes that will 
facilitate reconciliation within and across society as key mechanisms to build trust, 
cooperation and cohesion. This is vital because, as Jeong observes (2005: 39), rising above 
social divisions and reducing animosities between conflict groups as well as between the 
state and society is crucial for the successful implementation and realisation of peace-
building projects. It is evident that external stakeholders are investing much positive 
energy and resources in peace-building processes in South Sudan. An integrated and 
holistic, as opposed to fragmented, approach to development and conflict transformation 
efforts, by stakeholders will achieve the desired results. Healing and confidence building 
among the various communities of South Sudan is considered an important entry point to 
conflict transformation, peace bulding, and long-term development.  The stakeholders, 
especially the regional and international partners of South Sudan, are postioned to make 
enduring and constructive contributions to reconciliation and peace-building in the 
country through consistent and deliberative support to grassroots-led development 
initiatives and the community-owned conflict management and resolution projects.  This 
blend of development and conflict transformation efforts have the potential to create 
sustainable linkages that are felt by and visible to the South Sudanese public – a promising 
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situation bound to reinforce and restore confidence in the prospects for transforming 
conflict,  building peace, and mitigating the threats of fragility. 
 
Additionally, more progress is likely to be achieved if external and internal stakeholders 
heighten their efforts and direct more resources and focus on projects that will build the 
capacities of the government, civil society and local NGOs to interdependently manage and 
be involved in decision-making processes for peace, to overcome the challenges to peace 
and development. The achievement of these objectives will herald an era where South 
Sudan lives in peace with its neighbours as a politically inclusive nation-state, a country 
founded on solid internal unity, and an economically viable sovereign country. 
 





Note: The pyramid model and the suggested approaches aim to provide possible policy 
ideas for South Sudan. It should be noted that the expectation that the recommended 
framework will bring about peace and security in South Sudan is methodologically 
subjective, and may not uniformly apply across post-conflict situations. Thus, the Lederach 
Model's application to South Sudan does not imply universal applicability without 
adaptations; rather the model would need to be adjusted to accommodate the variations of 
each conflict and post-conflict situation.  Cases of conflict transformation differ in variation 
and complexity, and each individual case requires a transformation strategy that fits the 
uniqueness of the situation at hand.  By the same token, the implementation of peace-
building strategies, which comprise a series of interrelated activities, varies from one post-
conflict society to another. 
 
4.4. Policy Recommendations 
Having provided a general policy perspective on how to build sustainable peace, this 
section focuses on suggesting policies for South Sudan, relating to the major political, socio-
economic and security challenges identified in the previous chapter. Note is taken that the 
agenda of building South Sudan is crowded with many important tasks. However, the 
factors that will transform South Sudan primarily lie in consolidating national unity 
(through opening up the political space for the opposition and underrepresented ethnic 
groups), while simultaneously embarking on serious economic development programmes, 
which capitalise on the natural strengths of the South Sudanese people and the natural 
resources of the country. 
 
 Embrace South Sudan's Traditional Institutions to Accelerate Modernisation: 
There is need to establish solid political, economic, and social infrastructure in an 
integrated traditional framework of conflict resolution mechanisms and 
participatory and inclusive approaches to building state institutions. The 
government and stakeholders need to support the establishment of community-
based conflict aversion and mitigation mechanisms, inclusive of local leaders, 
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women, youth and civilians to develop skills to address conflict without violence. 
Programmes should be established that create a viable political framework that 
seeks to end ethnic conflicts and pave the way for economic development – 
primarily agriculture as the main activity of the overwhelming majority of South 
Sudanese; and embrace forward-looking policies for good governance. 
 
 Embrace South Sudan's Diversity to Solidify National Unity: South Sudan should 
enlist the influence and power of all ethnic leaders to mobilise their supporters to 
collaborate in sustained inter-ethnic cooperation.  South Sudan's ethnic diversity is 
an asset that should be capitalised upon to help the country conquer its current 
challenges.  The dividends of independent South Sudan should trickle down to the 
entire population; this will, in turn, cultivate confidence in the emerging state's 
national character and perpetuate collaboration among the populace. The sense of 
belonging to a nation that cares for its citizens will not be limited to ethnic leaders 
but permeate the entire society.  It would also create a sense of obligation and 
reciprocation of the ruling parties to cooperate with the leaders, as well as a self-
perpetuating cycle of mutual trust that strengthens internal cohesion. With the 
expanded institutionalisation of this policy in theory and practice (which is hoped to 
be the case for a prosperous South Sudan), a robust sense of affiliation to the 
country that transcends ethnic divisions and loyalties will prevail in South Sudan. 
 
 Develop Agriculture to Banish Food Insecurity, Eliminate Poverty, and Embark 
on Sustainable Development: Poverty is not known to be peace friendly, making 
the economic challenges South Sudan faces of paramount importance.  Considering 
that the overwhelming majority of South Sudanese subsist on farming, it is 
imperative that the government of South Sudan and its partners in nation-building 
adopt policies and dedicate substantial resources and more attention to developing 
the agricultural base of South Sudanese households through a nationwide long-term 
strategy aimed at achieving food security within the shortest period of time.  In this 
regard, NGOs, who are playing a very constructive role in independent South Sudan, 
should increasingly shift their focus to promoting agriculture.  Food security is a 
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vital foundation upon which all else is built and from sustained food security will 
emanate the outcomes that citizens and stakeholders of South Sudan desire.    Food 
security needs to and can be accomplished within a maximum of two harvests.  
 
Fighting poverty and stabilising security through agriculture has immediate and 
long-term gains and will make South Sudan food secure even after its oil reserves 
run out. The most realistic strategy to reintegrate former combatants is to engage 
them in modernising agriculture in South Sudan, a massive sector with a promising 
potential. As South Sudan is primarily an agricultural society, economic 
development policies should assign the highest priority to improved farming 
practices, achieving food security and setting the country on the path to prosperity.  
In this respect, national development strategies should be adopted to modernise 
agriculture through the regulation of land tenure, the protection of traditional 
farming, while modernising it (through agriculture extension programmes) and 
developing infrastructure to unleash the power of trade and market forces. 
 
 Expand the Reach of Social Services:  Improving basic social services is one of the 
effective entry points for the government to foster a stronger sense of a new 
national identity. Existing social services should be equitably distributed to expand 
their reach to remote communities. Development that extends to the periphery, 
rather than concentrating on Juba only, could prove a rallying point for national 
unity.  
 
  Peaceful and Principled Resolution of the Disputes with the Sudan: The 
dispute with Sudan over the outstanding issues in the CPA agreement are important 
mainly because South Sudan's oil revenues were lost when oil production was 
halted; it is important to resume production in order to sustain the fledgling 
economy.  The difficulty is that South Sudan has no control whatsoever, of how fast 
or slow the resolution of the dispute will be, and therefore, the country should not 
bank on the quick return of the South Sudan-Sudan relationship to normalcy.  
However, resolving the dispute with Sudan is in the interests of South Sudan and the 
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Sudan, and as such South Sudan should miss no opportunity to peacefully settle the 
outstanding issues based on the framework agreements the two countries, with the 
active support and mediation of AU/IGAD, have developed.  As the disputes drag on 
the uncertainties are equally detrimental to both the Sudan and South Sudan, and 
the latter should exert efforts to end the dispute at the earliest opportunity so that 
the country can refocus its energy on strategic domestic priorities. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
The thrust of this chapter is premised on the assumption that the tools and mechanisms for 
addressing South Sudan’s post-independence challenges are embedded in the traditional 
and modern political and social structures of South Sudan. The country holds opportunities 
for the diverse social strata (women, youth, leaders and ordinary citizens) to contribute to 
conflict transformation and peace-building. The prime challenge has been seeking avenues 
to create conditions conducive to the effective and sustained participation of all 
stakeholders, including the critical top, middle and grassroots leaders in South Sudan’s 
peace-building processes. Departing from this premise, the chapter explored the 
presupposition that the key to managing, not only the fragile state of peace, but also 
advancing development in South Sudan are peaceful negotiation and dialogues, aimed at 
addressing South Sudan’s political and socio-economic challenges and disputes with Sudan; 
and the launch of reconciliation projects aimed at national/societal healing and confidence 
building, especially at the grassroots or local community levels. The chapter attempted to 
apply Lederach’s Pyramid Model, tailored to the specifics of South Sudan as a workable 
framework to tackle the challenges in the newly independent country with its rich and 
diverse ethnic composition. The model's relevance to South Sudan is evident from its focus 
on and the high priority it assigns to the need and importance to embrace and coordinate 
an all-inclusive vertical and horizontal peace-building process of in-conflict and post-
conflict societies. The model also encourages broader grassroots participation as a conduit 
to creating a strong sense of ownership of the peace processes, a prerequisite to durable 
conflict transformation and post-conflict peace. 
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Cognisant of the current realties in South Sudan, wherein the implementation of the 
Pyramid Model is envisaged, the chapter further provided general recommendations on 
policy priorities to address the acute and urgent challenges in the specific areas of South 
Sudan’s diversity, political representation, food insecurity and poverty, and the South 
Sudan-Sudan dispute. Against this background and building on prior chapters, the next 






5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study engaged in an analysis of the challenges impinging on effective conflict 
transformation and peace-building processes in South Sudan. It also sourced information 
and mechanisms on how these challenges can be managed and how sustainable peace can 
be built through short- and long-term processes. Since attaining independence in 2011, the 
subject of South Sudan as a new state and the complex peace and development challenges it 
is facing, has become a very topical issue and an area of concern for government, regional 
and international organisations, academics and individuals and researchers on Africa. 
 
As a point of departure, the research study's main arguments, objectives, questions and 
hypotheses were outlined, as well as the growing literature on conflict transformation and 
peace-building. To gain an understanding of South Sudan’s journey to the post-conflict and 
post-independence phases, as well as the complexities of its predisposing environment, the 
study undertook a historical examination of its conflict history with Sudan. The two 
consecutive and devastating South Sudan-Sudan civil wars were the result of a multiplicity 
of causes. While the first civil war was ethnically-oriented and centred on issues of 
underdevelopment and the socio-political and economic marginalisation of the South, the 
discovery of resources, especially oil, and the desire to control and own it, greatly 
contributed to and exacerbated the second civil war. As such, the second civil war which 
began in 1983 took the form of a protracted violent conflict and provided the basis for a 
clearer understanding of the social, political and economic dimensions of the conflict.  The 
1972 Addis Ababa Agreement which ended the first civil war was shaped by the need to 
resolve the conflict and build peace. However, efforts to resolve the second civil war were 
influenced and complicated by the resource factor. Despite the enormous historical 
contributions of the 2005 CPA that was signed between the GoS and the SPLM/A to 
officially end this war, post-independent South Sudan demonstrated the implementation 




South Sudan transitioned from a post-conflict territory of Sudan into a sovereign state that 
encounters its own internal and external challenges. South Sudan is at a crossroads, as its 
strained relationship with the Sudan as well as domestic challenges, distract it from 
concentrating on rebuilding its dilapidated infrastructure.   Extensive efforts are underway 
by the government of South Sudan and its partners to transform the country into a 
sovereign, peaceful nation-state. In the drive for nation-building, the pursuit of peace in 
South Sudan has remained a central concern, encountering endless obstacles, as is the case 
in situations when nations emerge out of conflict.  South Sudan faces many complex 
obstacles, but the most challenging are the continuous cross-border resource and land 
conflicts with Sudan, on the one hand, and the growing internal confrontations among 
some South Sudanese ethnic groups, on the other. The challenges South Sudan has 
encountered are the teething pains of a new country, except that South Sudan inherited a 
state infrastructure that was malfunctioning at best or non-existent at worst.  Such a legacy 
complicated and continues to impact the ability of the government to discharge its 
responsibilities in the vital security, economic, social, national unity, and political spheres 
of state- and nation-building.  
 
Despite these challenges, South Sudan's independence has opened opportunities for the 
South Sudanese to thrive and prosper.  Efforts to peacefully settle the conflict with the 
Sudan are bearing fruit: the September 27, 2012 peace agreement brokered by the AU is 
one such gain.  Joint efforts and the commitment of substantial resources by the GoSS and 
external and internal stakeholders, (like the AU, IGAD, UN, and CSOs) continue to 
contribute to peace and development initiatives. These initiatives have had encouraging 
results in terms of building infrastructure, laying the foundation for state institutions, and 
most importantly, maintaining internal stability and defending the sovereignty of 
independent South Sudan. 
 
This study recommended the application of John Paul Lederach’s pyramid model of conflict 
transformation in South Sudan. This model is based on a comprehensive framework of 
constructive conflict transformation, which runs through the three major categories of top, 
 
 115 
middle and grassroots levels of leadership, where these actors engage in a variety of 
interdependent activities. This approach to peace-building takes into account the interests 
of all stakeholders and underscores the importance of the local society in driving and 
owning its peace-building process. Building on this premise, a broad outline was provided 
for the effective implementation of peace initiatives in a post-conflict and complex 
environment like South Sudan, where peace should be treated as a strategic asset, the 
attainment of which requires the coordination of all efforts and home-grown initiatives and 
tools.  For this model to succeed, leaders at all levels would not only engage the different 
activities provided for in the pyramid model, but would also need to ensure broader 
societal inclusion and participation in the peace-building processes.   
 
The study underscored the immense potential of South Sudan's diverse and rich ethnic 
composition and therefore underscored the need to accommodate this diversity. South 
Sudan's ethnic diversity was a formidable force that united the entire nation to vote for 
complete independence in January 2011. The South Sudanese hoped that an independent 
South Sudan would open hitherto closed doors to realise their dreams of a dignified, 
secure, prosperous, proud, and free society that they were denied under the rule of 
successive Sudanese governments. The same force that bonded South Sudanese to seek and 
achieve independence will enable them to overcome ethnic differences in a peaceful and 
negotiated manner, forge strong unity, join hands in nation-building, and lead to a cohesive 
new country. It is incumbent on the GoSS to recognise the country's diverse nature. 
 
The protracted dispute with the Sudan over the outstanding issues from the CPA 
represents the single most important national and foreign policy challenge for South Sudan. 
South Sudan’s resolve to reach a peaceful, negotiated settlement despite its slow, tortuous, 
painful, and frustrating progress is a viable policy option that will pay security dividends 
not only to South Sudan but to the Sudan as well.     
 
South Sudan, a new nation emerging from decades of violent conflict and confronted with a 
series of challenges, has demonstrated diplomatic savvy and maturity in its relationships 
not only with neighbours, friends and allies but also with its enemies.  This diplomatic path 
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will secure the political support of neighbouring countries and lead to prosperity through 
economic cooperation and trade with neighbours, secure borders, cordial and cooperative 
ties with the IGAD, AU, the UN, EU, and alliances with major global powers.  The recent 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act passed by the US government to give South Sudan 
access to the US market is testimony that diplomatic savvy is benefitting South Sudan.           
 
The conflict transformation and peace-building challenges in South Sudan are similar to 
comparable post-conflict societies, except that, unlike other countries, South Sudan 
encountered immediate economic and security threats from Sudan, its former ruler, as well 
as domestic risks emanating from the dispute with the Sudan and internal dissent caused 
by governance challenges that the GoSS needs to address.  However, the study found that 
the role of ethnic groups in a country with a large numbers of ethnic communities evolves 
with the political and economic dynamics of post-conflict society and that the pressing 
issues of each phase of the conflict defines their ever-changing roles. The study also 
established that ethnic diversity has the potential to serve multiple purposes – the South 
Sudanese, despite their rich ethnic diversity, overwhelmingly voted for independence but 
disagreements surfaced over governance and access to power, wealth, and opportunities 
after independence.  The study further discerned that a young country like South Sudan, 
with limited resources and little experience in the craft of inter-state relationships can 
command hefty diplomatic clout, when compared with countries that achieved 
independence decades earlier.     
 
The long term consolidation of peace in South Sudan is closely linked to the security 
situation in the country. At the centre of durable security, a national priority; is domestic 
peace among South Sudanese. Achieving domestic peace requires the intensification of 
efforts to consolidate existing peace gains and break new internal peace grounds.  Ethnic, 
national, and civil society organisations have a crucial role to play in such initiatives, while 
the state plays the central role in coordinating the diverse initiatives into a national 
platform. Dispute resolution mechanisms to build mutual relations and strengthen trade 
relations between South Sudan and Sudan must also be encouraged. Given that achieving 
sustainable peace in any post-conflict society, and specifically in South Sudan, also aims to 
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build durable state-society relations, the state must devise ways and means of interacting 
with civil society in order to consult on issues of national importance that require citizen 
support for the responsible exercise of public authority; define the political and socio-
economic rights and obligations of the state and society; negotiate how public resources 
should be allocated; and set up systems for broader representation and enhanced 
accountability. 
 
This study concludes with the assertion that attaining sustainable peace in South Sudan, as 
in other nations emerging from conflict, is a long-term project; peace-building in South 
Sudan is an ongoing process. Despite the challenges, there has been some progress, but 
more resources and efforts need to be harnessed to attain viable peace. Post-independent 
South Sudan’s experience and the country-specific internal and external conflict variations 
provide evidence that even though conflict transformation and peace-building models are 
valid and relevant, further research is necessary to devise situation-specific micro-models 
that address the unique characteristics that define distinct conflicts.  One way of achieving 
this goal would be to conduct in-depth research on ongoing violent or escalating conflicts in 
preparation for conflict transformation and peace-building in the post-conflict stage.  The 
South Sudan experience is rich with new phenomena and post-conflict-post-independence 
challenges; it presents untapped opportunities for further research to apply to current 
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